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PREVENTING BALKANIZATION OR  
FACILITATING RACIAL DOMINATION:  
A CRITIQUE OF THE NEW EQUAL PROTECTION 
Darren Lenard Hutchinson 
The Supreme Court requires that equal protection plaintiffs 
prove defendants acted with discriminatory intent. The intent 
rule has insulated from judicial invalidation numerous policies 
that harmfully impact racial and ethnic minorities. Court 
doctrine also mandates that state actors generally remain 
colorblind. The colorblindness doctrine has led to the judicial 
invalidation of policies designed to ameliorate the conditions of 
racial inequality. Taken together, these two equality doctrines 
facilitate racial domination. The Court justifies this outcome on 
the ground that the Constitution does not protect “group rights.”  
Constitutional law theorists have criticized these aspects of 
equal protection doctrine. Recently, however, some theorists 
have defended the Court’s discarding of group-based equal 
protection. They argue that social justice advocates should 
pursue redress for vulnerable groups by asserting dignity-based 
liberty claims under the Due Process Clause. In a widely cited 
article, Professor Kenji Yoshino argues, in fact, that dignity is 
the “New Equal Protection.” Applying insights from “social 
capital theory,” Yoshino contends that group-based equal 
protection causes “pluralism anxiety”—or a fear of 
“balkanization” among the justices. Dignity arguments, by 
contrast, do not present such concerns because they rest on 
appeals to universal justice.  
This Article contests the view that the Court should discontinue 
class-based equal protection in order to maintain social 
cohesion. Leading social capital theorists find that 
multiculturalism, though temporarily divisive (if at all), provides 
many long-term benefits. Also, numerous social psychology 
studies find that racial and ethnic inequality cause far more 
social disruption than group-based identities. This empirical 
research also demonstrates that the Court’s equality doctrine 
mirrors the views regarding race relations held by most whites, 
while contradicting the perspectives of most persons of color. 
The enforcement of white majoritarian viewpoints should not 
serve as the foundation for an equality doctrine. 
Antisubordination theory, by contrast, would provide more 
egalitarian outcomes and should inform Court doctrine. 
4 Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law [Vol. 22:1 
INTRODUCTION 
HE Supreme Court’s equal protection doctrine is in a state of disar-
ray. Critics have condemned the Court for applying counterintuitive 
and ahistorical doctrines.1 Some of the harshest critics argue that the 
Court has inverted the meaning of equal protection such that it no longer 
protects vulnerable classes.2 Others contend that the Court extends pro-
tection primarily to advantaged groups.3 In addition, some scholars de-
scribe the current equal protection doctrine as undertheorized.4  
Recently, some scholars have tried to place the Court’s seemingly 
problematic rulings within a broader doctrinal and social context. Specif-
ically, these scholars contend that the Supreme Court is uncomfortable 
with the traditional suspect class analysis.5 The Court believes that 
1 See Julie A. Nice, Equal Protection’s Antinomies and the Promise of a Co-
Constitutive Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1392 (2000) (criticizing the “class 
to classification” shift in equal protection doctrine); Stephen A. Siegel, The 
Federal Government’s Power to Enact Color-Conscious Laws: An Originalist 
Inquiry, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 477 (1998) (arguing that application of strict color-
blindness doctrine to federal legislation does not comport with historical mean-
ing of equal protection). 
2 See Reva B. Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The 
Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111 (1997) 
[hereinafter R. Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects] (arguing that 
equal protection doctrine functions as a preserver of social privilege and subor-
dination). 
3 See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Unexplainable on Grounds Other than 
Race”: The Inversion of Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection Juris-
prudence, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 615, 637–81 (2003) [hereinafter Hutchinson, 
Inversion of Privilege and Subordination]. See also R. Siegel, Why Equal Pro-
tection No Longer Protects, supra note 2, at 1114–46 (contending that Equal 
Protection privileges reinforce existing sexual and racial hierarchies). 
4 See Susannah W. Pollvogt, Windsor, Animus, and the Future of Marriage 
Equality, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 204 (2013) (discussing uncertainty 
caused by the Court’s use of “animus” in equal protection”); Jane S. Schacter, 
Ely at the Altar: Political Process Theory Through the Lens of the Marriage 
Debate, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1363, 1376 (2011) (arguing that the Court’s equal 
protection cases “simply contain very little by way of exposition.”). 
5 See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An 
Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278 
(2011) [hereinafter R. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization]; Neil 
S. Siegel, Race-Conscious Student Assignment Plans: Balkanization, Integra-
tion, and Individualized Consideration, 56 DUKE L.J. 781 (2006) [hereinafter S. 
Siegel, Race-Conscious Student Assignment Plans]; Kenji Yoshino, The New 
Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747 (2011) [hereinafter Yoshino, The New 
Equal Protection]. 
T 
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group-based equal protection leads to balkanization.6 If society splinters 
into numerous groups, then this will diminish social cohesion.7  
Although the Court has stopped using group-based equal protection, 
it has occasionally provided redress to vulnerable classes who have 
framed their claims as deprivations of due process.8 These contemporary 
due process rulings invalidate state action that deprives individuals of 
“dignity.”9 Unlike the suspect class doctrine, the dignity cases do not rest 
explicitly on the assertion that certain groups require more rigorous pro-
tection by the Court.10 Because dignity rights are universal, they do not 
balkanize society or disrupt social cohesion.11  
Kenji Yoshino’s article, The New Equal Protection, urges legal 
scholars and lawyers to consider using dignity-based arguments rather 
than asserting group-based equality claims.12 Yoshino agrees with the 
Court’s contention that group-based equal protection divides society, and 
he offers literature from social capital theorists—primarily Robert Put-
nam—to support his arguments.13 Yoshino, however, finds hope for vul-
nerable classes in dignity-based claims, noting the successful litigation 
by petitioners in Lawrence v. Texas and Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.14  
Although Yoshino’s work has received a tremendous amount of at-
tention from legal scholars, other theorists, such as Rebecca L. Brown, 
suggested before Yoshino that liberty and dignity arguments could be-
come the “new equality.”15 Also, Leslie Meltzer Henry’s recent research 
demonstrates that the Court has referred to dignity as a basis for deciding 
cases since the 1940s.16 Notably, the word “dignity” has recently ap-
peared with greater frequency in Supreme Court opinions.17  
6 See sources cited supra note 5.  
7 Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 5, at 751–76 (discussing 
social cohesion, diversity, and equal protection). 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 776–85 (discussing new dignity doctrines). 
10 Id. at 793 (dignity doctrine “stresses the interests we have in common as 
human beings rather than the demographic differences that drive us apart”).  
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 751–54 (discussing “pluralism anxiety” and borrowing from Robert 
Putnam’s research). 
14 Id. at 777–81 (discussing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)); id. at 
783 (discussing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833 (1992)). 
15 Rebecca L. Brown, Liberty, the New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491 
(2002). 
16 Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 
169, 178–79 (2011) (arguing that over 100 of the 220 Supreme Court cases that 
contain the word “dignity” were decided in the last 20 years). 
17 Id.  
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The Court has never stated that it has abandoned the suspect class 
doctrine. Silence regarding doctrinal changes, however, does not obscure 
reality. In recent case law, equal protection has become a toothless in-
strument for advocates of social justice and victims of subordination. 
The Court has not recognized a new suspect class since 1977.18 Also, the 
Court has repeatedly rejected compelling arguments that certain politi-
cally and socially vulnerable groups constitute a suspect class.19  
The Court has also refused to interpret the Equal Protection Clause 
as a legal prohibition of subordination. Instead, the Court narrowly con-
strues equal protection as barring only state action that differentiates on 
the basis of prohibited categories.20 The Court adheres to this doctrinal 
choice regardless of whether the state action seeks to remedy discrimina-
tion, ameliorate subordination, or to promote public benefits, such as 
academic diversity.21 Accordingly, the Court’s rulings have severely cur-
tailed the usefulness of the Equal Protection Clause as a source of re-
dress for vulnerable classes.22  
Many factors, other than fear of balkanization, could explain the 
Court’s dismantling of group-based equal protection. Some critical theo-
rists, for example, contend that the Court has abandoned equal protection 
analysis because a majority of the justices either harbor hostility toward 
the classes who seek judicial solicitude or generally disfavor civil rights 
litigation.23 Other theorists offer less damning reasons, finding, for ex-
ample, that structural concerns, like federalism and separation of powers, 
explain the Court’s rejection of a robust equal protection analysis.24 
Structural concerns and judicial bias, however, can operate simultane-
ously. Throughout American legal history, opponents of racial justice 
have frequently invoked states’ rights and federalism concerns in order 
to defend racial subordination.25 Furthermore, the Court’s rigid applica-
18 See Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 5, at 757.  
19 See infra text accompanying notes 63–77. 
20 See infra text accompanying notes 323–30. 
21 Id. 
22 See R. Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects, supra note 2. 
23 See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE 
L.J. 1141, 1142 (2002) (suggesting that a “unifying thread behind the Court’s 
innovative constitutional case law” is “an anti-antidiscrimination agenda, deeply 
felt but as yet poorly theorized”); Girardeau Spann, Affirmative Action and Dis-
crimination, 39 HOW. L.J. 1, 72 (1995) (arguing that the Court’s decision to ne-
gate an affirmative action plan results from “good, old-fashioned racial discrim-
ination, pure and simple”). Cf. Amy Ronner, Scouting for Intolerance: The Dale 
Court’s Resurrection of the Medieval Leper, 11 L. & SEXUALITY 53 (2002) (ar-
guing that homophobia impacts Court decisions regarding access to public ac-
commodations by gays and lesbians). 
24 Hutchinson, Inversion of Privilege and Subordination, supra note 3, at 
673–76 (discussing institutional concerns and equal protection). 
25 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Have the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism 
Decisions Increased Liberty?, 21 HUM. RTS. 3, 9 (2002) (“Segregation and dis-
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tion of strict scrutiny review of race-conscious state action complicates 
the structural explanation. According to the Court, racial classifications 
are presumably unconstitutional, regardless of context or purpose. This 
rigid stance toward state and federal policies undermines structural ar-
guments in defense of a restrained equal protection doctrine.26  
While many factors might explain the Court’s retreat from the sus-
pect class doctrine, this Article primarily addresses the balkanization 
argument. From an empirical standpoint, legal scholars have persuasive-
ly demonstrated that the Court and individual justices have invoked a 
fear of balkanization as a reason for rejecting the equal protection claims 
of vulnerable classes or for invalidating race-conscious state action.27 
This Article does not quarrel with this empirical observation. Instead, 
this Article contends that the Court’s stated fear of balkanization requires 
closer scrutiny. Scholars who write on this subject tend to take the 
Court’s stated anxiety regarding social conflict at face value. For several 
reasons, however, legal theorists should subject the Court’s contention to 
a more rigorous analysis.  
First, the Court fails to make a convincing argument that group-
based equal protection actually causes balkanization. In fact, the Court 
has not supported this assertion with empirical research but instead relies 
primarily upon its own precedent. Second, even if group-based equal 
protection leads to balkanization, this fact alone does not justify with-
drawing protection from vulnerable classes. The Court appears to believe 
that social cohesion is more important than racial justice, but this argu-
ment is hardly beyond debate. Indeed, the historical context in which the 
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified suggests that racial equality is a par-
amount interest of states and Congress, and the Supreme Court should 
not compromise racial justice in order to appease individuals who sup-
port the status quo of racial inequality and for whom racial redress caus-
es tension.  
crimination were defended less on the grounds that they were desirable practic-
es, and more in terms of the states’ rights to choose their own laws concerning 
race relations.”); Norman W. Spaulding, Constitution as Countermonument: 
Federalism, Reconstruction, and the Problem of Collective Memory, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 1992, 2033 (2003) (“Respect for state sovereignty . . . became a 
powerful, publicly acceptable, and legally authoritative framework for express-
ing the rather perverse desire to abandon the principles of equality implicated in 
the War for the sake of reconciliation with southern whites.”); Timothy Zick, 
Statehood as the New Personhood: The Discovery of Fundamental “States’ 
Rights,” 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 213, 316 (2004) (observing that “the phrase 
‘states’ rights,’ for many, conjures a host of negative associations, including, for 
some, virulent racism”). 
26 Hutchinson, Inversion of Privilege and Subordination, supra note 3, at 
674–79 (questioning transparency of the Court’s invocation of institutional con-
cerns in equal protection cases). 
27 See infra text accompanying notes 39–80. 
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Legal scholars who have analyzed the Court’s fear of balkanization 
have provided much more substantive justification for abandoning the 
suspect class doctrine than the Court’s summary conclusion. Neverthe-
less, many of these scholars take the Court’s stated fear of social tension 
at face value. Yoshino, however, offers empirical research in social capi-
tal studies that purportedly demonstrates the balkanizing impact of 
group-based identity and the negative impact of multiculturalism.28 A 
number of social scientists, however, have conducted empirical studies 
that raise serious questions regarding the validity of the claims that so-
cial capital theorists make regarding groups and social cohesion.29 The 
quality and volume of this research greatly diminishes the usefulness of 
social capital theory as a justification for discarding group-based equali-
ty. 
In addition to questioning social capital theorists’ arguments about 
groups and social cohesion, social scientists have conducted numerous 
empirical studies that provide a more accurate account of the dynamics 
of the Court’s equal protection doctrine, particularly with respect to race 
and racism. For example, social psychology studies demonstrate the per-
vasiveness and resilience of group-based dominance.30 Social psycholo-
gists have also conducted studies that demonstrate that whites are more 
likely to support colorblindness and assimilation than persons of color 
and that persons of color are more likely to support group-based identi-
ties and multiculturalism than whites. 31 Thus, to the extent that tension 
arises from group-based equality, this tension is one-sided: it largely 
causes stress among dominant racial groups. 
Furthermore, social psychology research demonstrates that societies 
often create or promote legitimizing myths or collective narratives to 
justify group domination.32 With respect to race relations in the United 
States, colorblindness helps to justify unequal distribution of power 
among racial groups.33 If race is an insignificant social characteristic, 
then it should not influence social policy.  
Also, a recent study indicates that whites believe that they suffer 
more discrimination than blacks.34 This legitimizing myth powerfully 
impacts the desirability of race-based remedies among whites. If whites 
believe that they are racial victims, then they will view policies that seek 
to provide additional resources to persons of color as harming whites.  
Furthermore, whites tend to believe that the United States offers 
equal opportunity for social and economic advancement regardless of 
28 See Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 5, at 751–54. 
29 See infra text accompanying notes 133–80. 
30 See infra text accompanying notes 185–95. 
31 See infra text accompanying notes 195–204. 
32 See infra text accompanying note 195. 
33 See infra text accompanying note 207. 
34 See infra text accompanying notes 213–27. 
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race. People of color do not agree with this contention.35 Empirical re-
search finds that people who believe that society has achieved racial 
equality are particularly uncomfortable with policies that provide redress 
and remediation to persons of color.36 The presumption that the United 
States has achieved a post-racial status provides strong support for oppo-
nents of race-based remedies. The opponents of race-conscious public 
policies contend that persons of color no longer need relief because the 
country has eliminated racism. 
These empirical findings provide a helpful social context for under-
standing the Court’s equal protection doctrine. Indeed, as this Article will 
demonstrate, the Supreme Court’s equality cases, by impact or intent, 
mirror the leading legitimizing myths regarding contemporary race rela-
tions in the United States that whites tend to believe. Like the white ma-
jority, the Court: (1) eschews multiculturalism and prefers colorblind-
ness; (2) believes that group-based identity and equality claims harm 
society and that individualism is preferable; (3) treats racism as largely 
vanquished by historical battles and social evolution; and (4) perceives 
of whites as vulnerable racial victims.37 Because current equal protection 
doctrine mirrors majoritarian perspectives regarding race, legal scholars 
should closely scrutinize the justifications the Court provides for its de-
cision making. An equal protection doctrine that facilitates racial domi-
nation cannot constitute a fair interpretation of the Equal Protection 
Clause.  
This Article encourages lawyers and legal scholars to continue artic-
ulating equal protection theories that combat racial inequality. Although 
dignity-based arguments might offer some relief to subordinate classes, 
this doctrine alone cannot accomplish all of the work that a robust appli-
cation of equal protection could achieve. This Article argues that the 
Court should apply an equal protection doctrine designed to invalidate 
state action that reinforces the social and political subordination of peo-
ple of color and other vulnerable classes. Such a doctrine would wel-
come multiculturalism and group-based identity as necessary elements of 
a just society. This doctrine would also recognize that the appropriate-
ness of colorblindness or race-consciousness depends upon context. Pol-
icies that seek to ameliorate racial inequality do not presumptively vio-
late the Constitution even if they utilize racial classifications. On the 
other hand, state action that reinforces racial hierarchy violates the Con-
stitution even if it is facially neutral with respect to race. Furthermore, 
the “newer” equal protection that this Article advocates would rest on the 
empirically demonstrable reality that race remains a substantial barrier to 
equality in the United States and that whiteness remains a privileged cat-
egory.  
35 See infra text accompanying notes 205–06. 
36 See infra text accompanying notes 205–12. 
37 See infra text accompanying notes 227–69. 
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This doctrine would not mean that all whites are wrong and that all 
people of color are right. In fact, many whites support multiculturalism, 
while many people of color do not. Many whites support group-based 
equality, while many people of color do not. Instead, this doctrine would 
not structure equal protection to mirror the beliefs that socially dominant 
groups hold regarding the status of race relations. Thus, it would not 
privilege any racial group. Instead, it would prioritize equality enhance-
ment over the preservation of hierarchy. This goal does not offend equal 
protection.  
This Article evolves in four principal Parts. Part I generally analyzes 
and accepts the empirical claim that the Court has indeed pointed to a 
fear of balkanization in order to justify a retreat from group-based equal 
protection. First, Part I demonstrates that the balkanization discourse has 
appeared frequently in three areas of equal protection case law, namely, 
the application of colorblindness and antidifferentiation; the requirement 
of discriminatory intent in equal protection doctrine; and the Court’s re-
fusal to recognize additional suspect classes despite the persuasiveness 
of claims some vulnerable groups have made. Part I then briefly exam-
ines the historical use of dignity arguments in judicial opinions and ana-
lyzes the recent escalation of such arguments. Next, Part I examines the 
claim that the Court has moved to dignity-based due process claims and 
away from group-based equal protection claims because it fears balkani-
zation. Finally, Part I considers how social capital theory has informed 
legal scholarship that supports dignity-based due process claims over 
group-based equal protection. 
Part II considers whether social capital literature justifies the Court’s 
concern with balkanization and its retreat from group-based equal pro-
tection. Part II first examines social capital literature that finds cultural 
pluralism harmful to society, but argues that this literature does not justi-
fy the Court’s fear of balkanization and its movement away from the 
suspect class doctrine. Robert Putnam, a leading social capital theorist 
(and the scholar whose work most influenced Yoshino’s The New Equal 
Protection), forcefully rejects the argument that his scholarship compels 
the rejection of group-based equal protection and the end of policies de-
signed to promote racial diversity and equality. Instead, Putnam contends 
that racial and ethnic diversity engenders many important societal bene-
fits. While Putnam has retreated somewhat from his claims regarding the 
destabilizing impact of multiculturalism, he now argues that a younger 
generation of Americans has found a common identity and is reengaging 
in political and civic activity—despite racial and ethnic differences. Part 
II then examines numerous social science studies that debunk or raise 
questions regarding Putnam’s methodology and findings as well as the 
research of other social capital theorists. 
Part III considers whether the Court’s evasion of the suspect class 
doctrine prevents balkanization or facilitates racial subordination. Part 
III first analyzes the work of social psychologists, who, unlike social 
capital theorists, have studied the relationship of groups and society for 
2015] A Critique of the New Equal Protection 11 
nearly a century. Part III demonstrates that many social psychologists 
consider group-based identity an essential dimension of human societies. 
Furthermore, group-based domination has always existed in human soci-
eties. Part III then discusses various empirical studies regarding the sub-
stance of contemporary race relations in the United States. Specifically, 
Part III examines social psychology studies that find that whites are 
much more likely than persons of color to embrace colorblindness over 
multiculturalism and that persons of color are much more likely than 
whites to embrace multiculturalism over colorblindness. Furthermore, 
empirical research demonstrates that whites tend to support ideals of in-
dividualism over group identity, while persons of color favor group iden-
tity over individualism. Part III also demonstrates that whites tend to 
believe that racism no longer remains a significant barrier to social and 
economic advancement, while people of color believe that race is a sub-
stantial obstacle to equal opportunity. Next, Part III analyzes empirical 
research that finds that whites believe that they are racial victims—
possibly to a greater extent than persons of color—but that people of 
color do not share this opinion. Part III also discusses how whites’ em-
brace of these positions regarding racism helps to justify pervasive racial 
inequality. Part III then compares dominant group ideas regarding race 
with the Court’s equal protection doctrine to demonstrate that the Court 
has implemented each of the four system-preserving beliefs that whites 
have regarding race relations. In other words, the Court’s equal protec-
tion doctrine enforces dominant racial perspectives that legitimize racial 
inequality. The incorporation of these viewpoints into equal protection 
doctrine facilitates racial inequality in two ways. First, it justifies the 
judicial invalidation of state action that seeks to reduce racial hierarchy. 
Second, it shields from judicial invalidation facially neutral laws or poli-
cies that impose serious harms upon persons of color.  
Part IV advocates for the construction of a “newer” equal protection 
that actually protects vulnerable classes rather than facilitating racial in-
equality. Part IV maps out the contours of this doctrine, observing that it 
would rest on a firm empirical understanding of United States race rela-
tions, including the value of multiculturalism, the inevitability and im-
portance of group identity, the persistence of racism and racial inequali-
ty, and the privileged status of whiteness. While this newer equal 
protection theory would not seek to supplant dignity claims, this Article 
does recognize the limits of dignity arguments and the need for advo-
cates of social justice to utilize equal protection alongside other types of 
legal doctrines.  
12 Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law [Vol. 22:1 
I.   BALKANIZATION AND EQUAL PROTECTION 
Several legal scholars contend that the Court’s fear of balkanization 
has impacted equal protection doctrine.38 This Part finds substantial sup-
port for these scholars’ empirical claim that evading balkanization has 
become a central component of equal protection doctrine. Some of these 
scholars have offered empirical research to support the Court’s fear that 
group-based equal protection polarizes society, including studies con-
ducted by social capital theorists, particularly Robert Putnam (whose 
research has influenced scholars within and outside of the legal acade-
my).39 Putnam contends that multiculturalism diminishes civic engage-
ment and trust among members of society and causes people to withdraw 
into themselves. Putnam’s research, if accurate, could potentially justify 
the Court’s retreat from the suspect class doctrine.40 
A.   Balkanization: The Empirical Claim 
The Court has indisputably cited a concern with balkanization as a 
reason to reject group-based equal protection claims. This fear of social 
tension has justified the Court’s application of a very rigid strict scrutiny 
of state action that uses racial classifications to remedy current and his-
torical discrimination or that seeks to promote a public good, such as 
diversity in higher education. The Court has also invoked balkanization 
or opposition to group remedies as a basis for requiring discriminatory 
intent in equal protection cases and for declining to find any new suspect 
classes.  
1.   Colorblindness, Affirmative Action, and Balkanization 
Members of the Court began referring to balkanization in the first 
case the Court decided that challenged an affirmative action program. In 
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, Justice Powell rejected 
the university’s argument that the Court should not apply strict scrutiny 
to its race-based affirmative action program.41 The university argued that 
because whites do not constitute a politically vulnerable class, extraordi-
38 See R. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization, supra note 5; 
Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 5. 
39 Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 5. See Robert D. Putnam, 
E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and the Community in the Twenty-First Century, 30 
SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUD. 137 (2007) [hereinafter Putnam, E Pluribus Unum]. 
40 Putnam, E Pluribus Unum, supra note 39. 
41 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 288 (1978) (writing for 
the plurality and disagreeing with the university’s assertion “that the court be-
low erred in applying strict scrutiny to the special admissions program because 
white males, such as respondent, are not a ‘discrete and insular minority’ requir-
ing extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process”). 
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nary intervention by the Court into the political process that led to the 
policy was not warranted.42  
Powell, however, argued that the Constitution forecloses a “two-
class theory” of equal protection that treats blacks as “special wards enti-
tled to a degree of protection greater than that accorded others.”43 Alt-
hough the Court had previously relied upon footnote four of Carolene 
Products v. United States as a justification for applying strict scrutiny to 
policies that harm discrete and insular minorities, Powell argued that all 
racial classifications should receive strict judicial scrutiny.44  
Powell defended his position, in part, on the grounds that if the 
Court were to determine which racial groups lacked political power, this 
would inevitably lead to competing and shifting claims of discrimination 
by numerous groups, which would require an analysis beyond the com-
petence of the Court—even if “socially desirable.”45 According to Pow-
ell, toleration of some race-based policies and intolerance of others could 
“exacerbate racial and ethnic antagonisms, rather than alleviate them.”46 
During the Rehnquist Court, several justices, including Justices 
O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, contended that racial classifications di-
vide society. In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., for example, 
O’Connor argued that racial classifications can “lead to a politics of ra-
cial hostility” and that the dissent’s “watered-down version of equal pro-
tection review, effectively assures that race will always be relevant in 
American life.”47 O’Connor also suggested that even if the Court should 
more rigorously protect politically vulnerable classes under a theory of 
equal protection, then this case would qualify for strict scrutiny because 
Richmond blacks occupied five of nine seats on the city council and con-
stituted fifty percent of the local population.48 As a result, blacks domi-
nated whites, rendering them socially and politically vulnerable.49  
Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Croson expresses an unmistakable 
belief that race-conscious remedial policies cause racial divisions:  
42 Id. at 290. 
43 Id. at 295. 
44 Id. at 291 (“Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently sus-
pect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination.”); United States v. 
Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). 
45 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 297. See also id. at 295–96 (“[T]he white ‘majority’ it-
self is composed of various minority groups, most of which can lay claim to a 
history of prior discrimination at the hands of the State and private individuals. 
Not all of these groups can receive preferential treatment and corresponding 
judicial tolerance of distinctions drawn in terms of race and nationality, for then 
the only ‘majority’ left would be a new minority of white Anglo-Saxon 
Protestants.”). 
46 Id. at 298–99 
47 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493, 495 (1989). 
48 Id. at 495. 
49 Id. at 495–96. 
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Racial preferences appear to “even the score” (in some 
small degree) only if one embraces the proposition that 
our society is appropriately viewed as divided into races, 
making it right that an injustice rendered in the past to a 
black man should be compensated for by discriminating 
against a white.50 
Justice Thomas makes a similar observation in his concurring opin-
ion in Adarand Constructors v. Peña.51 Thomas describes affirmative 
action as “racial paternalism” and asserts that such policies have disas-
trous effects upon blacks and social harmony.52 According to Thomas, 
policies of affirmative action: 
[E]ngender attitudes of superiority or, alternatively, pro-
voke resentment among those who believe that they 
have been wronged by the government’s use of race. 
These programs stamp minorities with a badge of inferi-
ority and may cause them to develop dependencies or to 
adopt an attitude that they are “entitled” to preferences.53 
As Reva Siegel has argued, the Court’s contention that race-based 
state action divides society has continued during the Roberts era.54 In 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District Num-
ber 1, Chief Justice Roberts’s plurality opinion culls numerous quota-
tions from Supreme Court precedent in order to portray governmental 
usage of race for socially productive purposes as promoting the same 
divisions, stereotypes, and harms caused by Jim Crow-era segregation.55 
And while Justice Kennedy disagrees with the plurality’s conclusion that 
states do not have a compelling interest in remedying the geographic 
isolation of students of color, he argues that racial classifications can 
diminish social cohesion:  
Governmental classifications that command people to 
march in different directions based on racial typologies 
can cause a new divisiveness. The practice can lead to 
corrosive discourse, where race serves not as an element 
of our diverse heritage but instead as a bargaining chip 
in the political process.56 
50 Id. at 528 (Scalia J., concurring). 
51 Adarand Constructors v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
52 Id. at 240. 
53 Id. at 241.  
54 See R. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization, supra note 5 
(discussing the use of balkanization discourse in C.J. Roberts Court opinions). 
55 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 
741–42 (2007). 
56 Id. at 797. 
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Kennedy describes race as a political trump card, rather than a basis for 
distributive justice. Although Kennedy strives to find a middle ground 
between the dissent and the plurality, he ultimately concludes that gov-
ernmental policies that utilize racial categories most likely harm, rather 
than improve, society.  
As the Court’s statements regarding social disruption indicate, the 
justices generally disapprove of policies that treat people as members of 
groups rather than as individuals.57 The Court demonstrates its disdain 
for group identity by holding, particularly in affirmative action cases, 
that the Constitution secures individual rights—not group rights.58 If the 
Court refuses to validate group-based identity and rights, then, presuma-
bly, it can prevent the erosion that racial categorization causes.  
2.   Discriminatory Intent Rule 
To prevail on an equal protection claim, the Court requires plaintiffs 
to demonstrate that the defendant acted with discriminatory intent. Gen-
erally, when courts apply this rule, they do not find evidence of discrimi-
natory impact probative of discriminatory intent. Unless the pattern of 
discrimination is unmistakably a reflection of an improper motive, plain-
tiffs will need to provide some other circumstantial evidence of defend-
ants’ intent to discriminate.59  
The Court has offered several justifications for requiring discrimina-
tory intent, one being that an impact standard would raise substantial 
institutional concerns, such as separation of powers and federalism.60 
Because numerous facially neutral policies impact vulnerable racial 
groups, the Court must require additional evidence of intent in order to 
avoid aggrandizing the judiciary at the expense of state legislatures and 
Congress.61  
57 See S. Siegel, Race-Conscious Student Assignment Plans, supra note 5 
(linking rigid analysis in affirmative action cases with Court’s disdain for poli-
cies that overly emphasize group membership).  
58 Jack Greenberg, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Confronting the 
Condition and Theory, 43 B.C. L. REV. 521, 580–81 (2002) (discussing Court’s 
references to “group rights” in affirmative action cases). 
59 See generally Sheila Foster, Intent and Incoherence, 72 TUL. L. REV. 
1065 (1998) (analyzing the discriminatory intent requirement); David A. 
Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935 
(1989). 
60 Hutchinson, Inversion of Privilege and Subordination, supra note 3, at 
677 (discussing institutional concerns and the discriminatory intent rule). 
61 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976) (“A rule that a statute 
designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless invalid, absent compelling justifi-
cation, if in practice it benefits or burdens one race more than another would be 
far-reaching and would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a 
whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes 
that may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average black than to the 
more affluent white.”). 
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The Court also applies the discriminatory intent rule because it has 
found that the Equal Protection Clause does not protect group rights. 
Although the Court has not analyzed this issue at length, several scholars 
have observed that disparate impact theories rest most comfortably on a 
constitutional theory of group rights.62 Because the Court, however, be-
lieves that group identity and group-based equal protection divide socie-
ty, it has generally rejected disparate impact as proof of discrimination in 
equal protection cases.63 Even though equal protection plaintiffs who 
present evidence of discriminatory impact do not formally plead theories 
of collective rights, the Court, nonetheless, emphasizes the need for in-
dividualized proof of discrimination.64 
3.   The End of Suspect Classes 
The Court’s fear of balkanization has led to a third doctrinal devel-
opment: the demise of the suspect class doctrine. Two doctrinal moves 
effectively ended the suspect class doctrine. First, the Court has declined 
to recognize new suspect classes, despite compelling circumstances that 
could have justified expansion of the doctrine. Second, the Court has 
applied heightened scrutiny symmetrically, extending heightened scruti-
ny to whites and persons of color and women and men, despite the 
groups having very different histories with respect to group domination. 
These two developments both derive from the Court’s fear of balkaniza-
tion. 
a.   Failure to Recognize New Suspect Classes 
The Court has often, though not consistently, used a four-factor test 
to determine whether a group qualifies as a suspect class. Specifically, 
the Court considers whether the group: (1) has suffered from a history of 
discrimination; (2) lacks political power; (3) suffers discrimination due 
to an immutable characteristic; and (4) experiences discrimination on the 
basis of a trait that bears no relationship to its members’ ability to per-
62 See, e.g., Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFF. 108, 141–46 (1976) (advocating group-based equal protection doc-
trine in order to accommodate claims of discriminatory effects); Yoshino, The 
New Equal Protection, supra note 5, at 765 (recognizing that pluralism anxiety 
explains the discriminatory intent rule, in part, though not explicitly mentioned 
in Court rulings and observing that once the Court “imported this equal protec-
tion framework into the free exercise context . . . the Justices did avert to such 
anxiety”).  
63 See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 317 n.39 (1987) (“Finally, 
in our heterogeneous society the lower courts have found the boundaries of race 
and ethnicity increasingly difficult to determine.”). 
64 See id. at 292 (“Thus, to prevail under the Equal Protection Clause, 
McCleskey must prove that the decisionmakers in his case acted with discrimi-
natory purpose.”). 
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form or contribute to society.65 This test, first detailed in Justice Bren-
nan’s opinion for the plurality in Frontiero v. Richardson, draws from the 
political process theory alluded to in footnote four of Carolene Prod-
ucts.66 The Court uses this test to determine whether it should apply a 
more stringent level of review when certain classes, due to their political 
powerlessness, cannot protect themselves from abusive political decision 
making. 67 Dominant classes, by contrast, do not warrant heightened pro-
tection because they do not experience subjugation in the political pro-
cess.68  
The Court has inconsistently applied the Frontiero test, and many of 
the component factors remain undertheorized.69 Most importantly, how-
ever, the Court has effectively discontinued using this doctrine to find 
new suspect classes. Many scholars have persuasively argued that the 
suspect class doctrine now operates as a gatekeeper instead of a formula 
used to determine which groups suffer from political oppression.70  
65 See Noreen Farrell & Genevieve Guertin, Old Problem, New Tactic: 
Making The Case for Legislation to Combat Employment Discrimination Based 
on Family Caregiver Status, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1463, 1481–82 (2008) (“[The 
heightened scrutiny] factors include (1) the possession of an immutable charac-
teristic by members of the protected class, (2) the existence of a history of dis-
crimination against members of the class, (3) the relevance of the characteristic 
to legitimate decision making, and (4) the political power of the class.”) (cita-
tion omitted). 
66 See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684–88 (1973) (plurality 
opinion) (arguing that women constitute a suspect class); United States v. Caro-
lene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (suggesting a more “searching judi-
cial inquiry” of laws that stem from “prejudice against discrete and insular mi-
norities”).  
67 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 135–79 (1980) (considering prejudice against “minority” groups a po-
litical process failure). 
68 Id. 
69 See Jane Schacter, Ely at the Alter: Political Process Theory Through the 
Lens of the Marriage Debate, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1363, 1376 (2011) (“In the 
course of making political powerlessness an element of equal protection doc-
trine, the justices have had very little to say about what the idea of political 
powerlessness means and requires, and even less to say about the underlying 
idea of democracy informing the Court’s assessment of the political process. 
Supreme Court opinions simply contain very little by way of exposition.”); 
Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presump-
tion and the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 108 YALE L.J. 485, 565 (1998) 
[hereinafter Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias] (arguing that the standards for 
heightened scrutiny “are applied inconsistently across contexts”). 
70 Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias, supra note 69, at 558 (arguing that the 
Court uses the suspect class doctrine in order to “limit[] the number of groups 
deemed to deserve the courts’ solicitude”); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Not 
Without Political Power: Gays and Lesbians, Equal Protection, and the Suspect 
Class Doctrine, 65 ALA. L. REV. 975, 993 (2014) [hereinafter Hutchinson, Not 
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The Court has cited numerous structural reasons, including federal-
ism and separation of powers, to justify its refusal to find new suspect 
classes. Once the Court decides that a group constitutes a suspect class, 
this finding would imply the judicial invalidation of most or all state and 
federal action that discriminates against the group.71 The suspect class 
doctrine, if successfully asserted by a particular class, would give the 
Court enormous oversight of state and federal laws that discriminate 
against that group. To prevent such augmentation of the judicial power, 
the Court applies the suspect class doctrine with great caution—
arguably, to the point of discarding the doctrine altogether.  
Institutional concerns, however, do not fully explain the Court’s re-
fusal to find new suspect classes. Instead, the Court has also expressed 
discomfort with group equality claims as a basis for denying suspect 
class status to certain groups—even when they have made a persuasive 
case for application of heightened protection. In Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Center, for example, the Court reviewed a Fifth Circuit ruling that 
held that a class of developmentally disabled persons qualifies as a qua-
si-suspect class, entitled to intermediate scrutiny.72 The Court reversed 
the portion of the appellate ruling that found quasi-suspect status, alt-
hough it affirmed the judgment invalidating the discriminatory municipal 
ordinance.73 The Court expressed a concern that creating a new suspect 
class would lead to a proliferation of group-based equality claims and 
create an unmanageable situation for the Court.74 
Similarly, in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 
the Court refused to treat people who live in poor school districts as a 
suspect class.75 The Court held that numerous difficulties would arise 
from an effort to recognize this class as a group and doing so could lead 
to an endless array of claims for group redress.76 
Without Political Power] (discussing gatekeeping nature of suspect class doc-
trine). 
71 See, e.g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 444–45 (1985) 
(expressing reluctance to apply heightened scrutiny due to chilling effect on 
federal legislation). 
72 See id. at 432. 
73 See generally id. 
74 See id. at 445–46 (“Fourth, if the large and amorphous class of the men-
tally retarded were deemed quasi-suspect for the reasons given by the Court of 
Appeals, it would be difficult to find a principled way to distinguish a variety of 
other groups who have perhaps immutable disabilities setting them off from 
others, who cannot themselves mandate the desired legislative responses, and 
who can claim some degree of prejudice from at least part of the public at large. 
One need mention in this respect only the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, 
and the infirm. We are reluctant to set out on that course, and we decline to do 
so.”). 
75 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). 
76 Id. at 27–28 (“Assuming a perfect correlation between district property 
wealth and expenditures from top to bottom, the disadvantaged class might be 
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Ironically, in Bakke, Justice Powell, who strongly condemned group-
based equal protection in the context of race, explicitly endorsed the 
class approach for “other” groups seeking judicial solicitude.77 Nonethe-
less, the Court has effectively retreated from this doctrine as well, leav-
ing many vulnerable groups susceptible to majoritarian abuses.  
b.   Class-to-Classification Shift 
The Court’s symmetrical application of strict and heightened scruti-
ny in equal protection cases also marks a retreat from the suspect class 
doctrine. Rather than protecting vulnerable classes, such as blacks or 
women, from discrimination, contemporary equal protection disallows 
the use of certain classifications, like race or sex, by state actors.78 The 
class-to-classification shift in equal protection doctrine demonstrates that 
the Court has abandoned the suspect class doctrine literally and substan-
tively. Nonetheless, the Court still has not announced a standard for de-
termining whether a classification on its own is constitutionally suspi-
cious. Instead, the Court merely points to the historical subordination of 
women and persons of color to explain why it should follow a classifica-
tion approach.79 In other words, the Court extends judicial solicitude to 
persons, like white men, who have not suffered historical or present-day 
subordination, because the historical subjugation of people of color and 
women makes race and sex inappropriate bases for public policy. That a 
long history of racial oppression justifies invalidation of policies de-
signed to alleviate the harms of this history offers compelling evidence 
that equal protection no longer provides justice for racial and ethnic mi-
norities.80 
viewed as encompassing every child in every district except the district that has 
the most assessable wealth and spends the most on education.”); id. at 28 
(“However described, it is clear that appellees’ suit asks this Court to extend its 
most exacting scrutiny to review a system that allegedly discriminates against a 
large, diverse, and amorphous class, unified only by the common factor of resi-
dence in districts that happen to have less taxable wealth than other districts.”). 
77 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290 (1978) (arguing that 
the suspect class factors “may be relevant in deciding whether or not to add new 
types of classifications to the list of ‘suspect’ categories” but that “[r]acial and 
ethnic classifications . . . are subject to stringent examination without regard to 
these additional characteristics.”) (citations omitted). 
78 See Nice, supra note 1, at 1400. 
79 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 213–18 (1995) 
(discussing numerous cases involving discrimination against persons of color to 
justify applying strict scrutiny to all racial classifications). 
80 See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Co. 488 U.S. 469, 528–29 (Marshall, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that “[i]t is a welcome symbol of racial progress when 
the former capital of the Confederacy acts forthrightly to confront the effects of 
racial discrimination in its midst” but lamenting that “[a] majority of this Court 
holds . . . that the Equal Protection Clause . . . blocks Richmond’s initiative”); 
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B.   Dignity and the Supreme Court 
Currently, equal protection doctrine denies substantial protection to 
vulnerable social groups. Nevertheless, in a few recently decided cases, 
dignity-based claims brought under the Due Process Clause have offered 
some hope to disadvantaged groups, particularly LGBT individuals. The 
successful use of dignity arguments in social justice litigation has gener-
ated a substantial amount of academic literature, which this section ana-
lyzes.  
1.   Historical Usage of “Dignity” in Supreme Court Opinions 
Although recent academic literature regarding the Court’s use of 
dignity analysis to decide due process claims might leave the impression 
that it is a novel judicial development, dignity-based outcomes have a 
long historical presence in Supreme Court cases. Leslie Meltzer Henry’s 
work, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, reveals that the word “dignity” ap-
pears in over nine hundred Supreme Court opinions.81 Furthermore, the 
Court has made appeals to dignity in numerous contexts outside of the 
Due Process Clause.82 And while many theorists have criticized the Su-
preme Court for failing to provide a concrete definition of dignity, the 
Court has relied upon this concept with greater frequency in recent case 
law.83  
Rejecting the essentialist and reductionist approaches she sees in 
current scholarship, Henry canvasses all of the references to dignity in 
Supreme Court cases in order to determine the different concepts the 
Court has used dignity to express. Henry agrees that the Court has used 
dignity-based doctrines to protect liberty interests, such as abortion 
rights and sexual conduct, but the Court has also made appeals to dignity 
in order to defend “institutional status,” “equality,” “personal integrity,” 
and “collective virtue.”84 Thus, as Henry concludes, dignity has a con-
tingent meaning, and the Court uses the term primarily to emphasize or 
“give weight to the substantive interests that are implicated in specific 
contexts.”85 
id. at 562 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“I never thought that I would live to see 
the day when the city of Richmond, Virginia, the cradle of the Old Confederacy, 
sought on its own, within a narrow confine, to lessen the stark impact of persis-
tent discrimination. . . . Yet this Court, the supposed bastion of equality, strikes 
down Richmond’s efforts as though discrimination had never existed or was not 
demonstrated in this particular litigation.”). 
81 Henry, supra note 16, at 178.  
82 Id. at 172–73. 
83 Id. at 171. 
84 Id. at 190. 
85 Id. 
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2.   Contemporary Dignity Cases and Academic Reaction 
Henry’s work demonstrates that among legal theorists, the Court’s 
use of “dignity” in sovereign immunity cases has received the most 
analysis.86 A more recent strand of scholarship discusses the use of digni-
ty in liberty-based due process litigation.87 This set of cases arguably 
constitutes a new equal protection doctrine because they accomplish 
some equality norms in the absence of a formal equal protection claim.88 
The linkage of liberty and dignity has a very long presence in United 
States political theory, and, more generally, in Greek and Roman philos-
ophy.89 With respect to modern history, the first Supreme Court decision 
to merge liberty and dignity is Thornburgh v. American College of Ob-
stetricians and Gynecologists, which invalidated numerous provisions of 
a Pennsylvania antiabortion law.90 The Court also emphasized dignity in 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.91 The joint 
opinion in Casey describes dignity in very broad terms:  
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal 
decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contracep-
tion, family relationships, child rearing, and education. 
Our cases recognize “the right of the individual, married 
or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental in-
trusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person 
as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.” Our 
86 Id. at 175 n.32 (citing many sources). 
87 Id. at 206–12. This Article assumes for the sake of argument and ease of 
presentation that the Court has crafted a dignity doctrine. The better argument, 
however, is that the dignity cases represent a compromise orchestrated by Jus-
tice Kennedy, whose relative centrism typically controls the outcome of close 
cases, such as equal protection and liberty adjudication. See R. Siegel, From 
Colorblindness to Antibalkanization, supra note 5 (arguing that judicial centrists 
show the most concern regarding balkanization). 
88 See Henry, supra note 16, at 203, 204–05. See also Yoshino, The New 
Equal Protection, supra note 5, at 783 (discussing equality dimensions of recent 
dignity cases). 
89 See Henry, supra note 16, at 206 (“The notion that humans deserve re-
spect as free, autonomous, sovereign, and self-determined agents is so en-
trenched in American political liberalism that it appears self-evident. Its origins 
can be traced back to ancient Greece and Rome, where the Stoics were among 
the first thinkers to connect humans’ unique capacity for moral reasoning with 
their dignity.”) (citations omitted).  
90 See Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 
747 (1986), overruled in part by Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsyl-
vania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion). See also Henry, supra 
note 16, at 174 n.25 (“[f]ew decisions are more personal and intimate, more 
properly private, or more basic to individual dignity and autonomy, than a 
woman’s decision . . . whether to end a pregnancy.”) (quoting Thornburgh, 476 
U.S. at 772) (ellipses in original). 
91 Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
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precedents “have respected the private realm of family 
life which the state cannot enter.” These matters, involv-
ing the most intimate and personal choices a person may 
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity 
and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the 
right to define one’s own concept of existence, of mean-
ing, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. 
Beliefs about these matters could not define the attrib-
utes of personhood were they formed under compulsion 
of the State.92 
The Supreme Court, however, has subsequently constrained the 
reach of Casey. In Washington v. Glucksberg, for example, the Court 
held that the Due Process Clause does not secure a right to physician-
assisted suicide.93 The Court specifically rejected the respondents’ use of 
Casey to justify recognition of such a right.94 Lawrence v. Texas, which 
found that “liberty” includes a right to engage in consensual sodomy, 
renewed scholarly arguments that the Court had created a new, possibly 
expansive, doctrine that combines concepts of liberty with dignity.95 
C.   Dignity, Equality, and Pluralism Anxiety  
Although many scholars have discussed the Court’s fear of balkani-
zation and the development of a dignity-based liberty doctrine, Kenji 
Yoshino offers a unique perspective to these debates by merging the is-
sues into one analysis. Yoshino contends that the Court’s fear of balkani-
zation—or pluralism anxiety—caused the shift to dignity-based claims.96 
Yoshino argues that dignity claims can avoid the balkanization associat-
ed with group-based equal protection because these claims rest on uni-
92 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
93 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997). 
94 Id. at 703 (“[A]lthough Casey recognized that many of the rights and lib-
erties protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy, it does 
not follow that any and all important, intimate, and personal decisions are so 
protected. Casey did not suggest otherwise.”) (internal citations omitted). 
95 See Henry, supra note 16 at 211 & n.215 (citing Nelson Lund & John O. 
McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas, and Judicial Hubris, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 
1583 (2004)); Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 5, at 778–81. 
96 Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 5, at 776 (“The Court has 
used liberty analysis to mitigate its curtailment of group-based equality analysis. 
This movement toward liberty has not secured all the ends that would have been 
available under an extension of the traditional group-based equal protection 
analysis. Nonetheless, progressives should pay more heed to this move toward 
liberty. The liberty-based dignity claim has been the Court’s way of splitting the 
difference between a direct extension of equality analysis and its absolute fore-
closure.”). 
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versality and commonality, rather than social distinctions.97 Dignity ar-
guments unite, rather than divide society because everyone has a right to 
privacy; everyone has a right to marry; everyone has a right to engage in 
consensual sexual behavior, and so forth. 
1.   Social Science and Pluralism Anxiety 
To document the harmful impact of pluralism, Yoshino relies primar-
ily upon the work of Robert Putnam, a Harvard political scientist, who 
has written extensively on social capital.98 Scholars have invoked social 
capital to describe several different concepts.99 In Bowling Alone, Put-
nam’s first sustained examination of social capital, he uses the term to 
describe the macro-benefits of engaged social interaction: 
Whereas physical capital refers to physical objects 
and human capital refers to properties of individuals, so-
cial capital refers to connections among individuals—
social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trust-
worthiness that arise from them. In that sense social cap-
ital is closely related to what some have called “civil vir-
tue.” The difference is that “social capital” calls 
attention to the fact that civic virtue is most powerful 
when embedded in a dense network of reciprocal social 
relations. A society of many virtuous but isolated indi-
viduals is not necessarily rich in social capital.100 
Civic participation, measured by voting rates, community-group 
membership, social engagement with coworkers, philanthropy, and other 
variables, concerns Putnam the most. His research finds that the level of 
civic participation in the United States has declined precipitously since 
World War II.101 Putnam contends that the decline in civic participation 
will harm society, because social interaction through civic engagement 
engenders numerous important social benefits, including improvements 
in education and child welfare, reduction of crime, greater economic 
prosperity, more health and happiness, and greater democratic participa-
tion.102 
97 Id. at 793 (“The new equal protection paradigm stresses the interests we 
have in common as human beings rather than the demographic differences that 
drive us apart. In this sense, the shift from the ‘old’ to the ‘new’ equal protection 
could be seen as a movement from group-based civil rights to universal human 
rights.”).  
98 See, e.g., ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND 
REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000) [hereinafter PUTNAM, BOWLING 
ALONE]. 
99 Id. at 18–20. 
100 Id. at 19. 
101 Id. at 31–147. 
102 Id. at 287–350. 
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Bowling Alone attributes much of the post-war decline in civic en-
gagement to broader structural and cultural changes in the United States, 
such as “pressures of time and money” on “two-career families”; “sub-
urbanization, commuting, and sprawl”; “electronic entertainment,” espe-
cially television; and a generic category of “generational change” (which 
Putnam concludes overlaps with the ascendency of television).103  
In Bowling Alone, Putnam rejects the notion that racism caused the 
massive reduction in civic engagement since the 1950s.104 Recently, 
however, Putnam links the reduction in civic engagement with the in-
creasing pluralism of the United States population. In a very controver-
sial and highly criticized article, Putnam argues that greater ethnic and 
racial diversity reduces the general level of trust in society—a precondi-
tion of civic engagement—and that this reduction occurs within and 
across social groups.105 According to Putnam, multiculturalism or social 
pluralism causes individuals of all races to “hunker down” or “to pull in 
like a turtle.”106  
It is important to note that Putnam concedes that greater diversity—
especially from immigration—produces very important social benefits, 
including greater creativity, rapid economic growth, a new work force to 
replace a generation of retirees, and improvement of the standard of liv-
ing in developing countries through North–South remittances.107 None-
theless, Putnam argues that the negative dimensions of immigration and 
multiculturalism should cause alarm. In addition to causing social isola-
tion, racial and ethnic diversity, according to Putnam, correlate with: 
• Lower confidence in local government, local lead-
ers, and the local news media 
• Lower political efficacy—that is, confidence in 
one’s own political influence 
• Lower frequency of registering to vote, but more in-
terest and knowledge about politics and more partic-
ipation in protest marches and social reform groups 
• Less expectation that others will cooperate to solve 
dilemmas of collective action 
• Less likelihood of working on a community project 
• Lower likelihood of giving to charity or volunteer-
ing 
• Fewer close friends and confidants 
• Less happiness and lower perceived quality of life 
103 Id. at 189–284. 
104 Id. at 279–80 (discussing racism as a possible factor in the reduction of 
social capital and rejecting this possibility for several reasons).  
105 Putnam, E Pluribus Unum, supra note 39.  
106 Id. at 149. 
107 Id. at 140–41. 
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• More time spent watching television and more 
agreement that “television is my most important 
form of entertainment”108 
Finally, Putnam suggests that, in spite of the short-term harms that 
diversity causes, the United States should not seek to “bleach out” all 
traces of difference.109 Instead, he argues that the United States should 
tolerate diversity, but manage its potentially negative effects by con-
structing a more flexible and expansive understanding of what it means 
to be an American.110  
2.   Social Capital and Dignity Theorists 
Yoshino explicitly relies upon Putnam’s arguments in order to pro-
mote the use of dignity doctrine as a substitute for group-based equality 
claims.111 Yoshino contends that dignity arguments could help litigants 
overcome the limitations of the Court’s shrinking equal protection doc-
trine, including the class-to-classification shift, discriminatory intent 
rule, and judicial rejection of legislative efforts to remedy discrimination 
against vulnerable groups.112 
Other scholars have criticized the suspect class doctrine for causing 
division and balkanization, without citing social capital theory.113 In ad-
dition, some theorists have explored the connections between dignity and 
equality without suggesting that one form of analysis should replace the 
other.114 With respect to using social capital theory to examine equal pro-
tection and dignity doctrine, Yoshino’s work seems to stand alone. Alt-
hough social capital theory makes some very provocative claims about 
the value of civic participation in the United States, this research does 
not justify judicial abandonment of the suspect class doctrine and group-
based equal protection. Part II elaborates on this position. 
II.   EQUAL PROTECTION, DIGNITY, AND GROUPS 
This Part argues that, for several reasons, social capital theory does 
not justify the Court’s retreat from group-based equal protection. First, 
108 Id. at 149–50. 
109 Id. at 164. 
110 Id. at 163–64 (“[M]y hunch is that at the end we shall see that the chal-
lenge is best met not by making ‘them’ like ‘us’, but rather by creating a new, 
more capacious sense of ‘we’, a reconstruction of diversity that does not bleach 
out ethnic specificities, but creates overarching identities that ensure that those 
specificities do not trigger the allergic, ‘hunker down’ reaction.”). 
111 Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 5, at 752–54, 774–75, 
792–93, 796. 
112 Id. at 776–87.  
113 EVAN GERSTMANN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERCLASS: GAYS, 
LESBIANS, AND THE FAILURE OF CLASS-BASED EQUAL PROTECTION (1999).  
114 Henry, supra note 16, at 199–205. 
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Putnam does not believe that this scholarship compels a retreat from 
group-based equal protection or from group-based identity. Also, social 
capital theorists, including Putnam, have discussed the benefits of racial 
and ethnic diversity at length. Furthermore, the social capital literature 
has generated an avalanche of academic criticism that severely under-
mines its credibility as a basis for constructing judicial doctrines or as a 
prescription for managing racial and ethnic diversity.  
A.   Social Capital Literature Does Not Justify a New Equal Protection 
Supreme Court justices and several legal scholars contend that tradi-
tional class-based equal protection doctrine divides society and leads to 
balkanization. On the surface, social capital literature provides some 
support for this position. For several reasons, however, social capital 
theory does not justify the Court’s retreat from class-based equal protec-
tion.  
1.   Robert Putnam Does Not Believe His Scholarship Justifies  
Opposition to Group-Based Egalitarian Policies 
In Fisher v. University of Texas, the Court remanded the case to the 
Fifth Circuit with instructions to apply the correct level of scrutiny to a 
university’s affirmative action program.115 Abigail Thernstrom, Stephan 
Thernstrom, Althea K. Nagai, and Russell Nieli filed an amicus brief in 
favor of the petitioner Abigail Fisher and in opposition to the university’s 
use of affirmative action.116 The brief challenges the argument made by 
the respondent, and validated by Court precedent, that racial diversity 
fosters cross-racial understanding and other compelling benefits for soci-
ety.117 To support this position, the Thernstrom brief cites to Putnam’s 
article E Pluribus Unum. The brief relies upon Putnam’s findings regard-
ing the impact of racial diversity upon society, including that it lowers 
trust and erodes civic participation.118  
115 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
116 Brief of Abigail Thernstrom, Stephan Thernstrom, Althea K. Nagai, and 
Russell Nieli as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 
133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345). 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 13 (“[P]eople of different racial and ethnic groups have a harder 
time getting along with one another—and trusting one another—than do people 
of the same race or same ethnic group. The more numerous the members of the 
outsider group present, and the more contact people have with them, the greater 
the level of inter-group distrust.”) (citations omitted); id. at 13 (“In racially and 
ethnically diverse communities, there is a decline in social solidarity, communi-
ty activities, and general neighborliness as people tend to withdraw into them-
selves and become more isolated and alienated from others nearby. In Putnam’s 
words, people under such circumstances ‘hunker down’ and ‘pull in like a tur-
tle.’”) (quoting Putnam, E Pluribus Unum, supra note 39, at 149). 
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The Thernstrom brief motivated Putnam to submit his own brief in 
favor of the University of Texas.119 Putnam contends that the Thernstrom 
brief misuses his research by selectively quoting a few observations that 
support Fisher’s position, while ignoring his conclusion that ethnic and 
racial diversity is inevitable and that it produces long-term benefits for 
society.120 Although Putnam does not specifically examine whether the 
suspect class doctrine causes racial friction, he endorses affirmative ac-
tion policies, notwithstanding the fact that these policies treat whites and 
persons of color disparately and rest upon a recognition of group-based 
differences:  
[P]olicies that seek a broad diversity, including racial 
and ethnic diversity, in educational institutions, such as 
those in use at UT, hold great promise in overcoming 
any potential short-run negative effects of diversity iden-
tified in the Thernstrom amici brief. A nation that is in-
evitably and increasingly diverse benefits from policies 
that promote social solidarity and trust through shared 
experiences and creation of a more inclusive social iden-
tity.121  
In addition, Putnam has anticipated arguments that many progres-
sives have made which link social capital with historical subordina-
tion.122 Tight, close-knit, homogeneous, and civically engaged communi-
ties helped to produce and sustain sexist, racist, xenophobic, classist, and 
sexually repressive policies.123 Conceding this reality, Putnam considers 
whether a necessary tension exists between social capital and equality. 
He forcefully rejects this position: 
Does this logic mean that we must in some funda-
mental sense choose between community and equality? 
The empirical evidence on recent trends is unambigu-
ous: No. Community and equality are mutually reinforc-
ing, not mutually incompatible. Social capital and eco-
nomic equality moved in tandem through most of the 
119 Brief for Robert D. Putnam as Amicus Curiae Supporting the University 
of Texas at 2, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) [hereinafter Put-
nam Brief] (“Dr. Putnam did not seek to become involved in this case, but be-
cause his findings on diversity were inaccurately and selectively described in 
the amicus curiae brief submitted by Abigail Thernstrom, Stephan Thernstrom, 
Althea K. Nagai, and Russell Nieli . . . he respectfully submits this brief to clari-
fy the record.”). 
120 Id. at 4–5. 
121 Id. at 21–22. 
122 See PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 98, at 358–59. See also infra 
text accompanying notes 168–79 (discussing role of social capital in fostering 
historical injustices). 
123 See infra text accompanying notes 168–79.  
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twentieth century. In terms of the distribution of wealth 
and income, America in the 1950s and 1960s was more 
egalitarian than it had been in more than a century. . . .  
[T]hose same decades were also the high point of social 
connectedness and civic engagement. Record highs in 
equality in social capital coincided.124 
Although Putnam equivocates on the causal relationship between equali-
ty and social capital, he nonetheless does not believe that egalitarian 
claims defeat social capital or vice versa.125 
Although the Supreme Court finds that affirmative action policies 
cause social division and balkanization, Putnam, one of the leading au-
thors in the field of social capital, believes that promoting diversity and 
group interaction will actually lead to greater social solidarity and cohe-
sion in the long-term and that “the race-conscious admissions policy that 
UT has implemented” will help facilitate the long-term management of 
racial difference.126 Putnam rejects the balkanization rhetoric as a reason 
for discarding group-based equal protection. He also disagrees with the 
idea that egalitarianism and social capital are incompatible. Thus, while 
some legal scholars and the Court have argued that race-conscious poli-
cies of inclusion cause social discord and divisions, Putnam argues that 
these practices have the opposite effect in the long-term and that they are 
necessary for an increasingly and inevitably pluralistic society. 
2.   Putnam Has Retreated Somewhat from His Earlier Positions  
Regarding the Decline in Social Capital 
In addition to criticizing the use of his research to oppose affirmative 
action, Putnam has moderated some of his assertions regarding the de-
cline in civic participation since the 1950s. For this additional reason, 
scholars should exercise caution before using Putnam’s work to justify 
the Court’s balkanization rhetoric.  
On March 2, 2008, Putnam published an essay in The Boston Globe 
that examines the “rebirth of American civic life.”127 Putnam argues that 
the 2008 Democratic presidential primaries and caucuses “have evinced 
the sharpest increase in civic engagement among American youth in at 
least a half-century, portending a remarkable revitalization of American 
124 PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 98, at 358–59 (emphasis in orig-
inal).  
125 Id. at 359 (conceding difficulty establishing causality between social 
capital and equality); id. at 358–59 (rejecting idea that social capital and egali-
tarianism are mutually exclusive). 
126 Putnam Brief, supra note 119, at 3–4. 
127 Robert Putnam, The Rebirth of American Civil Life, THE BOSTON 
GLOBE, Mar. 2, 2008, http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/ 
oped/articles/2008/03/02/the_rebirth_of_american_civic_life/?page=full. 
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democracy.”128 To support his contention, Putnam cites polling data of 
UCLA undergraduates that show an upswing in voting rates after years 
of continuous declines.129 Putnam attributes this rise in civic participa-
tion to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. He argues that the trage-
dy had a unifying effect upon all Americans, reminding them that “we 
are all in this together.”130 Putnam contends that the 2008 Democratic 
presidential primaries and caucuses mark the “coming-out” of a new po-
litically engaged generation.131 
Putnam made similar arguments regarding an increase in civic par-
ticipation among younger voters in another 2008 article, Still Bowling 
Alone? The Post-9/11 Split.132 Putnam believes that other societal fac-
tors, such as the unifying effects of the September 11 terrorist attacks, 
social media, and Barack Obama’s 2008 presidential campaign, have led 
to a revitalization of civic engagement.133 Thus, even if Putnam’s obser-
vations that link ethnic and racial pluralism with social anxiety and divi-
sion were correct, his later works suggest that these purported divisions 
have rapidly declined. Accordingly, his research and the writings of like-
minded social capital theorists provide questionable support for the Su-
preme Court’s balkanization rhetoric, its failure to validate the equal pro-
tection claims of vulnerable classes, and its hostile stance toward legisla-
tive remedies for discrimination and subordination. 
B.   Social Capital Scholarship Has Received an Abundance  
of Academic Criticism 
Social capital literature, particularly Putnam’s work, has generated 
an abundance of academic criticism. In fact, political scientist Carl 
Boggs made the observation regarding Bowling Alone that Putnam’s 
“iconic status does not prevent his book from being so conceptually 
flawed and historically misleading that it would seem to require yet an-
other large tome just to give adequate space to the needed systemic cri-
tique.”134 
Many authors agree with Boggs’s observation; social scientists have 
published several books and numerous articles that contest various as-
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Robert D. Putnam & Thomas H. Sander, Still Bowling Alone? The Post 
9/11 Split, 21 J. DEMOCRACY 9 (2010) [hereinafter Putnam & Sander, Still 
Bowling Alone], available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/ocpa/pdf/still%20bow 
ling%20alone.pdf. 
133 Id. at 10–13. 
134 Carl Boggs, Social Capital and Political Fantasy: Robert Putnam’s 
“Bowling Alone,” 30 THEORY & SOC’Y 281, 282 (2001), available at 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/657878.pdf?acceptTC=true&jpdConfirm=tr
ue. 
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pects of Putnam’s work.135 These critiques question the methodology of 
social capital literature and the fundamental observations this scholarship 
makes regarding the divisiveness of racial and ethnic diversity. Many of 
the studies contest the finding that a strong negative relationship between 
racial and ethnic diversity and social cohesion even exists. To the extent 
that such a relationship exists, some critics argue that it is “weak and 
contingent on various individual and contextual factors.”136 
This section reviews some of the leading academic critiques of the 
argument that racial and ethnic diversity have diminished the level of 
civic participation in the United States and has led to a society of isolat-
ed individuals. This section does not provide an independent empirical 
assessment of Putnam’s work. Instead, it relies upon reputable, persua-
sive, and voluminous empirical studies that question Putnam’s findings. 
Given the numerous problems that social scientists have observed re-
garding Putnam’s work, legal scholars should rethink using this research 
as a basis for explaining or justifying the Court’s balkanization rhetoric 
and the abandonment of group-based equal protection.  
1.   Causation Versus Correlation 
Many critics contend that Putnam’s research does not permit a firm 
conclusion regarding causation and that he has only shown (if at all) cor-
relation of social capital and a community’s well-being. Princeton soci-
ologists Alejandro Portes and Erik Vickstrom, for example, considered 
five variables that Putnam describes as “consequences of social capital: 
child welfare, single parenthood, economic inequality, poverty, and gen-
eral population health.”137 Because Putnam measures social capital levels 
135 See Steven N. Durlauf, Bowling Alone: A Review Essay, 47 J. ECON. 
BEHAV. & ORG. 259, 260 (2000) available at https://www.ssc.wisc.edu/econ/ 
archive/wp2029.pdf (“Bowling Alone is in many ways very disappointing, par-
ticularly when judged from the perspective of rigor or analytical depth. The 
many interesting facts that are documented are not subjected to a careful analy-
sis of their causes or their consequences. Hence in my judgment, as a piece of 
scholarly social science, the book is largely a failure.”); Dietlind Stolle & Marc 
Hooghe, Review Article: Inaccurate, Exceptional, One-Sided or Irrelevant? The 
Debate about the Alleged Decline of Social Capital and Civic Engagement in 
Western Societies, 35 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 149, 150 (2004), available at http://prof 
s-polisci.mcgill.ca/stolle/Publications_files/FinalBJPS.pdf (“The Bowling Alone 
thesis has been variously characterized as plainly wrong, pessimistic or tradi-
tional. A number of authors have claimed that Putnam idolizes the vanished 
hierarchical world of the 1950s, in which most women were home-makers and 
therefore had more time on their hands to engage in various civic duties. Others 
depict the decline thesis as pure nostalgia, a manifestation of the longing for a 
civic and engaged era that has clearly ended.”).  
136 Alejandro Portes & Eric Vickstrom, Diversity, Social Capital, and Cohe-
sion, 37 ANN. REV. SOC. 461, 463 (2011), available at http://www.annual 
reviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev-soc-081309-150022. 
137 Id. at 464. 
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simultaneously with these five variables, determining causation becomes 
impossible.138  
For example, Portes and Vickstrom question Putnam’s findings that 
social capital reduces juvenile delinquency and arrests. While it is plau-
sible that social capital leads to lower criminality and arrests among ju-
veniles, it is also reasonable to assume that lower rates of criminality 
foster community trust and civic participation.139 Portes and Vickstrom 
make similar arguments regarding the other four factors they studied. 
Because Putnam does not use a “time sensitive measure” of the rates of 
social capital and the dependent variables he claims are causally related 
to social capital, his research can only prove correlation and not causa-
tion.140 Other scholars have made similar observations regarding social 
capital and its purported societal benefits.141 
2.   Outmoded Measures of Civic Participation 
Scholars have also criticized Putnam’s use of dated and outmoded 
measures of civic participation. For example, Putnam finds that declin-
ing membership in organizations such as the League of Women Voters, 
Elks Lodge, Moose Lounge, Knights of Columbus, Rotary Club, 
NAACP, and Parent-Teacher Association demonstrates a fall in social 
capital and civic participation.142 Putnam also asserts that religious par-
ticipation, workplace connections, and informal social interactions foster 
greater social trust and higher levels of civic participation.143  
Critics, however, argue that many of Putnam’s measures of civic par-
ticipation are relics of a bygone era and that they are not essential for 
social cohesion. Portes and Vickstrom, for example, assert that “[m]utual 
trust and bowling leagues are nice things to have, but they do not repre-
sent a sine qua nom for a viable society.”144 Instead, “organic solidari-
138 Id. at 464–65.  
139 Id. at 464. 
140 Id. at 464–65. 
141 See, e.g., Steven Durlauf, supra note 135, at 262–64 (discussing causali-
ty flaws in Bowling Alone); Peter Nannestad, What Have We Learned About 
Generalized Trust, If Anything?, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 413, 429 (2008), avail-
able at http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.06060 
6.135412 (“Is growth the effect or one of the causes of generalized trust, or is 
there a two-way causation between generalized trust and growth/prosperity?”); 
Joel Sobel, Can We Trust Social Capital?, J. ECON. LIT. 139, 140 (2002), avail-
able at http://are.berkeley.edu/~cmantinori/prclass/Sobel.pdf (“[Bowling Alone] 
often confuses cause and effect. The argument of the book appears to be that 
measurable declines in group activities cause bad outcomes. With this interpre-
tation, reductions in monetary donations to charity may be seen as a conse-
quence of a decline in social capital . . . but not as direct proof that the stock of 
social capital has decreased.”). 
142 PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 98, at 48–64. 
143 PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 98, at 65–147. 
144 Portes & Vickstrom, supra note 136, at 472 (emphasis in original). 
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ty”—or agreement on a “set of norms that are understood and accepted 
by all and are enforced by specialized agencies”—can cohere diverse 
societies.145 “Mutual acquaintance” is not the exclusive route to social 
cohesion.146 
In addition, the list of organizations that Putnam utilizes as indica-
tors of civic engagement seems less relevant in a highly urbanized socie-
ty with rapidly changing notions of gender and race and with increasing 
class disparity.147 Church attendance has fallen as public policy has re-
lied more upon science and debate, rather than religious tenets.148 Many 
of the clubs that Putnam discusses, e.g., Rotary and Elks, are conformist 
and very traditional. Also, some forms of volunteerism declined because 
the organizations accomplished their short-term goals.149 Rather than 
indicating a decrease in social capital, declining membership in volun-
tary organizations could result from the changing needs of a larger seg-
ment of the population. 
Putnam also discounts new forms of civic participation. Even if 
membership in large organizations such as the Rotary Club has fallen, 
Putnam does not consider alternative forms of participation that are less 
formal and that emerge to deal with specific issues.150 Furthermore, as 
several of his critics have observed, Putnam gives very little attention to 
the creation of new outlets for highly political and communitarian activi-
ties such as the Internet, social media, and social movements.151 In Bowl-
ing Alone, Putnam devotes only 33 out of 539 pages to examining these 
145 Id. at 473. 
146 Id. 
147 Boggs, supra note 134, at 284 (discussing Putnam’s “arbitrary choice of 
indicators to reflect declining [social capital]”); Michael O’Connell, Anti ‘Social 
Capital’: Civic Values versus Economic Equality in the EU, 19 EURO. SOC. 
REV. 241, 242 (2003) (“It has been suggested that the data used by Putnam in 
his assessment of change in the USA may have masked the growth of new 
forms of social involvement, romanticized the quality and quantity of social 
involvement in the past, and ignored the change in organizational practices.”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
148 See Boggs, supra note 134, at 284. 
149 Id. (“The older voluntary organizations Putnam cherishes went into de-
cline precisely because they lost their raison d’etre as their goals became out-
moded, mostly reflective of a small-town America that itself was in the process 
of vanishing.”).  
150 C.S. Fisher, Bowling Alone: What’s the Score?, 27 SOC. NETWORKS 155, 
159 (2005) (discussing “ad hoc” volunteerism, such as “AIDS Walk, beach 
cleanup, or lobbying campaign”). 
151 See, e.g., Bob Edwards & Michael W. Foley, Much Ado About Social 
Capital, 30 CONTEMP. SOC. 227, 238 (2001) (criticizing Putnam’s dismissive 
analysis of social movements, new age churches, and workplace relationships); 
Fisher, supra note 150, at 159. 
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alternative forms of volunteerism, political action, and communitarian-
ism.152  
3.   Ignoring Racial and Class Inequality 
Many scholars have criticized Putnam and other social capital theo-
rists for their failure to account for racial and class inequality and segre-
gation (among other factors) in their work. Some of these scholars find 
that racial and class disparities have a greater negative impact on social 
capital than racial and ethnic diversity. Others have argued that racial 
isolation and segregation matter more than racial and ethnic diversity. 
Some researchers have found that after controlling for racial and class 
inequality, racial diversity has a small or insignificant impact upon social 
capital. These findings, if accurate, seriously undermine the use of Put-
nam’s work (and similar scholarship) to justify the Court’s balkanization 
rhetoric and abandonment of class-based equal protection.  
To test Putnam’s conclusions, political scientist Eric Uslaner has 
conducted several empirical studies regarding social cohesion. Uslaner 
concludes that “[r]esidential segregation, not diversity, leads to lower 
levels of trust” and that “[s]egregation has been linked to a wide range of 
negative outcomes.”153 In his research, Uslaner studies the level of geo-
graphical racial isolation in several countries, including the United 
States. The countries in which minority racial groups experience the 
highest levels of isolation also have the “lowest levels of generalized 
trust,” which social capital theorists treat as a precondition for civic par-
ticipation.154  
Putnam, by contrast, contends that diversity diminishes trust.155 Di-
versity and racial isolation, however, are not mutually exclusive con-
cepts.156 With respect to the United States, Uslaner finds that diversity 
diminishes trust primarily for whites, but not for African Americans 
(perhaps because trust levels among African Americans are typically 
low).157 On the other hand, integration and diversity increase trust sub-
152 See PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 98, at 148–89 (discussing 
possible bright spots in social capital, despite the overall decline). 
153 Eric M. Uslaner, Segregation, Mistrust and Minorities, 10 ETHNICITIES 
415, 416 (2010). 
154 Id. 
155 See generally Putnam, E Pluribus Unum, supra note 39.  
156 See Uslaner, supra note 153, at 424 (“Segregation and diversity are not 
the same thing.”) (emphasis in original); id. (“High levels of diversity are com-
patible with perfect segregation, perfect integration, or anything in between.”). 
157 Id. at 426; see also RODNEY HERO, RACIAL DIVERSITY AND SOCIAL 
CAPITAL: EQUALITY AND COMMUNITY IN AMERICA (2007) (criticizing social 
capital theorists for not taking race into account and finding that racial diversity 
damages social capital among whites much more than among persons of color). 
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stantially for both African Americans and whites, especially when these 
conditions lead to diverse friendship networks.158  
In another publication, Bo Rothstein and Uslaner analyze the impact 
of economic inequality and inequality of opportunity upon social trust.159 
Rothstein and Uslaner find that social trust levels are the highest in coun-
tries with greater economic equality.160 They also find a “powerful” neg-
ative relationship between trust and economic inequality in the United 
States using data from 1960 to 2002.161 Rothstein and Uslaner’s research 
also finds that as economic inequality widens, trust levels decline.162 The 
authors do not claim that inequality alone influences the level of social 
trust in a country, but they do find that the relationship between the two 
variables is pervasive and strong.163 
Numerous scholars have reached similar conclusions regarding the 
correlation between inequality and diminished social trust. Jong-sung 
You, for example, examines data from eighty countries, including the 
United States.164 Putnam’s research and similar scholarship would pre-
dict that greater racial, ethnic, religious, and linguistic diversity negative-
ly correlate with social trust. You, however, finds that only ethnic diver-
sity correlates with a decline in social trust.165 After controlling for 
political corruption and income inequality, however, ethnic diversity has 
no significant effect upon social trust.166  
158 Uslaner, supra note 153, at 424 (27% for whites, 30% for African Amer-
icans); see also id. (“Living in a city that is both diverse and integrated does not 
by itself increase trust. However, someone living in a city that is both diverse 
and integrated will be 27 percent more likely to trust others if (s)he has a diverse 
friendship network . . . .”). 
159 Bo Rothstein & Eric Uslaner, All for One: Equality, Corruption, and So-
cial Trust, 58 WORLD POL. 41 (2005). (The authors also examine how political 
corruption impacts trust, but this topic is beyond the scope of this Article.). 
160 Id. at 47–48.  
161 Id. at 48. 
162 Id. (“As we move from the low level of inequality in Belgium to the 
very high level in South Africa, trust declines by 23 percent.”). 
163 Id. 
164 Jong-sung You, Social Trust: Fairness Matters More Than Homogeneity, 
33 POL. PSYCHOL. 701, 714 (2012). 
165 Id. 
166 Id. See also Edward Fieldhouse & David Cutts, Does Diversity Damage 
Social Capital? A Comparative Study of Neighbourhood Diversity and Social 
Capital in the US and Britain, 43 CAN. J. POL. SCI. 289, 307–08 (2010) (dis-
cussing the “crucial” impact of poverty on social capital in the US and conclud-
ing that the effect of poverty “outweigh[s] that of diversity by some distance”); 
id. (arguing that the impact of poverty on social capital is less in Britain than in 
the United States and hypothesizing that lower levels of minority concentrated 
poverty probably explains this result); Marc Hooghe, Tim Reeskens, Dietlind 
Stolle, & Ann Trappers, Ethnic Diversity and Generalized Trust in Europe: A 
Cross-National Multilevel Study, COMP. POL. SCI. 198, 211 (2009) (“Income 
inequality affects the level of the trust as expected: People are more trustful in 
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This research challenges the connections that some social capital 
theorists have made between racial diversity and declining social capital. 
Social scientists have found that racial segregation and racial and eco-
nomic class inequality have a greater negative effect upon (or negative 
correlation with) social capital than diversity alone. Although Putnam 
acknowledges the possibility that class stratification causes rather than 
results from diminished social capital, he fails to give economic ine-
quality systematic treatment in Bowling Alone or E Pluribus Unum.167 In 
countries with low levels of income disparity.”); James Laurence, The Effect of 
Ethnic Diversity and Community Disadvantage on Social Cohesion: A Multi-
Level Analysis of Social Capital and Interethnic Relations in UK Communities, 
27 EURO. SOCIO. REV. 70, 85 (2011) (“Disadvantage . . . not only has a much 
stronger eroding effect on social capital than diversity, but is also associated 
with increasing intolerance. In fact, it is only when we control out disad-
vantage’s negative effect that diversity significantly improves tolerance. Any 
truly concerted effort to tackle problems of community tensions must take this 
into account and not relegate the role of disadvantage at the expense of simply 
attempting to encourage greater community interaction.”); Natalia Letki, Does 
Diversity Erode Social Cohesion? Social Capital and Race in British Neigh-
bourhoods, 56 POL. STUD. 99, 120 (2008) (finding a correlation between racial 
diversity and lower neighborhood trust, but nonetheless concluding that “when 
the association between racial diversity and economic deprivation is accounted 
for, there is no evidence for the eroding effect of racial diversity on interactions 
within local communities” and that “interactions improve perceptions of a 
neighbourhood, regardless of its economic status or racial composition, but 
these interactions are far less frequent in poorer neighbourhoods”); O’Connell, 
supra note 147 at 241–48 (arguing that economic equality is a much stronger 
predictor of social cohesion than social capital); Dan Rodríguez-García, Beyond 
Assimilation and Multiculturalism: A Critical Review of the Debate on Manag-
ing Diversity, J. INT’L MIGRATION & INTEGRATION 251, 268 (2010) (“[W]hen 
support for diversity occurs within a framework of social and political equality, 
and interaction across cultural difference becomes developed as a societal value 
. . . the heterogeneous and dialogic civic space the occurs is more likely to have 
the effect of leading to overall greater social cohesiveness, rather than to out-
comes of segregation and exclusion.”); see generally Portes & Vickstrom, supra 
note 136, at 470 (reviewing literature linking racial segregation and economic 
inequality to a decline in social capital). At least one author, however, discounts 
any link economic inequality and social capital; instead, he argues that Putnam 
fails to consider the particular forms of social interaction that take place in poor 
communities of color. See James DeFillippis, The Myth of Social Capital in 
Community Development, 12 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 781, 796–97 (2010) (dis-
cussing “trust-based relations” in “inner cities”). 
167 See PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 98, at 359 (conceding that 
“great disparities of wealth and power are inimical to widespread participation 
and broadly shared integration” but declining to “adjudicate this complicated 
historical question”); Putnam, E Pluribus Unum, supra note 39, at 157 (observ-
ing that “people who live in neighbourhoods of greater economic inequality also 
tend to withdraw from social and civic life”). 
                                                                                                                      
36 Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law [Vol. 22:1 
a more recent work, however, Putnam seems more convinced of the rel-
evance of economic inequality to social capital. He warns that: 
[T]he overall rise in youth political engagement and 
volunteering since 9/11 masks a pair of subtrends that 
are headed in different directions, with lower-class 
youth growing less involved while better-off youngsters 
become more involved. Since public discussion in the 
United States often tends to conflate class and race, it is 
important to emphasize that this growing gap among dif-
ferent groups of young people is about the former and 
not just the latter. 
If the United States is to avoid becoming two na-
tions, it must find ways to expand the post-9/11 resur-
gence of civic and social engagement beyond the ranks 
of affluent young white people. The widening gaps that 
we are seeing in social capital, academic ambition, and 
self-esteem augur poorly for the life chances of work-
ing-class youngsters. If these gaps remain unaddressed, 
the United States could become less a land of opportuni-
ty than a caste society replete with the tightly limited so-
cial mobility and simmering resentments that such so-
cieties invariably feature.168 
Putnam believes that social policy should address class inequality, 
but he fails to provide any specific vision regarding such remedies. 
Nonetheless, Putnam’s recognition of the relationship between economic 
inequality and declining social capital seriously calls into question the 
use of his research to validate the Supreme Court’s departure from 
group-based equal protection. If the Supreme Court truly believes that its 
doctrines should promote social cohesion, then it should vigorously uti-
lize the Equal Protection Clause to help eradicate group-based inequities; 
these inequities cause more social division than diversity alone. The 
Court, however, has taken the exact opposite approach and interprets the 
Equal Protection Clause in a manner that sustains social disadvantages 
and privileges.169  
4.   Negative Implications of Social Capital 
Social capital theorists have also received criticism because they 
treat the accumulation of social capital as inherently positive. This view, 
however, obscures the oppression and discrimination that civic participa-
tion and other forms of social capital can facilitate. Some social capital 
theorists distinguish “bonding” from “bridging” social capital. Bonding 
social capital describes civic engagement among small homogenous 
168 Putnam & Sander, Still Bowling Alone, supra note 132 at 14. 
169 See infra text accompanying notes 227–67. 
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groups, while bridging social capital refers to cohesion across a spectrum 
of different communities.170 Putnam argues that racial and ethnic diversi-
ty diminishes both types of group bonding.171 Putnam and other theo-
rists, however, tend to dismiss the harmful societal consequences of so-
cial capital—particularly the historical injustices facilitated by political 
participation within homogenous communities.  
Political scientist Barbara Arneil discusses the negative impact of 
bonding social capital in Diverse Communities, a comprehensive and 
methodical critique of Bowling Alone.172 As Arneil argues, Putnam de-
scribes the Progressive Era in glowing terms.173 Undoubtedly, early-
twentieth-century reformers pursued many laudable goals, including un-
ion organizing, social welfare, and expanded public education. These 
mass movements spurred by dynamic civic engagement also participated 
in and promoted some of the most oppressive practices and ideas in 
United States history, including eugenics, social Darwinism, xenophobia, 
forced assimilation, patriarchy, racism, forced sterilization, and sexual 
repression.174 
170 PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 98, at 22–23. 
171 See Putnam, E Pluribus Unum, supra note 39, at 143–44. 
172 See generally BARBARA ARNEIL, DIVERSE COMMUNITIES: THE PROBLEM 
WITH SOCIAL CAPITAL (2006). 
173 Id. at 15 (“In the penultimate chapter of Bowling Alone, Robert Putnam 
makes the case that the Progressive Era, a society he considers to be replete with 
social capital, provides a largely positive model of social connectedness.”). 
Arneil provides a good description of the “Progressive Era”: “The Progressive 
era dated from the end of the nineteenth century to around 1920 and was 
marked by a movement for social reform, particularly in urban centres, whereby 
community provision was made for the less well-off and immigrants . . . as well 
as by the larger political reforms of the Suffragette movement.” Id. at 15 n.1.  
174 See id. at 15–40 (discussing negative aspects of Progressive Movement); 
Irene Bloemraad, Compte Rendu: Diverse Communities, 33 CAN. J. SOCIO. 439, 
440 (2008) (review essay) (“The high point of social capital, which Putnam 
places in the Progressive Era, had a dark and oppressive side for women, ethnic 
and racial minorities, and those with disabilities. Civic unity, based on shared 
norms and a Christian vision of progress, meant forced assimilation for many 
immigrants and native Americans, exclusion of African Americans, forced steri-
lization of the disabled, and the assumption that women would work for the 
social capital of others and their community, but not their own empowerment.”); 
Pedro Cabán, Subjects and Immigrants During the Progressive Era, 23 
DISCOURSE 26–31 (2001) (discussing racist and xenophobic roots of United 
States “Americanization” policies and how public schools became instruments 
of these policies); Catherine Cocks, Rethinking Sexuality in the Progressive Era, 
5 J. GILDED AGE & THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 93 (2006) (discussing racist, sexist, 
and eugenics driven policing of sexuality during the Progressive Era); Gregory 
Michael Dorr, Defective or Disabled?: Race, Medicine, and Eugenics in Pro-
gressive Era Virginia and Alabama, 5 J. GILDED AGE & PROGRESSIVE ERA 359 
(2006) (discussing multiple dimensions of sexism, classism, racism, and eugen-
ics that informed forced sterilization legislation); Eric L. Goldstein, The Unsta-
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The use of social capital among close-knit and homogenous groups 
also helped to sustain racial violence and exclusion. Legal scholar 
Stephanie M. Stern addresses this subject in The Dark Side of Town.175 
Responding to the enthusiastic reception of social capital theories among 
property scholars, Stern argues that “sundown towns”—racially exclu-
sionary early-twentieth-century locales policed by actual and threatened 
racial violence—existed because whites successfully utilized in-group 
bonding to maintain white supremacy: 
In sundown towns, collective action was embedded 
in dense networks of social ties that spread information 
about riots, pledges, mob violence, and other coordinat-
ed action and channeled anti-black norms. Community 
cohesion helped to reward participants with social stand-
ing and group identity—benefits in addition to any im-
plicit compensation they derived from racist acts. 
Groups of residents or business owners gathered to sign 
pledges not to employ blacks or to allow them to live in 
the area. Residents converged on blacks to warn them to 
leave town.176  
Although Stern’s work focuses exclusively on antiblack practices, Chi-
nese Americans, Mexican Americans, and Native Americans experienced 
similar forms of racist mob violence, geographic exclusion, and dispos-
session.177  
ble Other: Locating the Jew in Progressive-Era American Racial Discourse, 89 
AM. JEWISH HIST. 383 (2001) (discussing negative portrayals of Jewish Ameri-
cans during Progressive Era); Mara L. Keire, The Vice Trust: A Reinterpretation 
of the White Slavery Scare in the United States, 1907–1917, J. SOC. HIST. 5 
(2001) (discussing use of intersecting corrupt businesses and white female sex-
ual purity tropes by Progressive Era anti-vice movement); Thomas C. Leonard, 
Retrospectives: Eugenics and Economics in the Progressive Era, 19 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 207 (2007) (discussing the eugenics basis for labor and immigration re-
form during the Progressive Era); Sally M. Miller, For White Men Only: The 
Socialist Party of America and Issues of Gender, Ethnicity and Race, 2 J. 
GILDED AGE & PROGRESSIVE ERA 283 (2003) (discussing racism, sexism, and 
Anglo-Saxon-centrism of the Socialist Party of America); Sarah Potter, “Unde-
sirable Relations”: Same-Sex Relationships and the Meaning of Sexual Desire 
at a Women’s Reformatory during the Progressive Era, 30 FEMINIST STUDS. 394 
(2004) (examining the racial, class, sex, and heterosexist dimensions of Progres-
sive Era sexual moralists). 
175 Stephanie M. Stern, The Dark Side of Town: The Social Capital Revolu-
tion in Residential Property, 99 VA. L. REV. 811 (2013). 
176 Id. at 843. See also Durlauf, supra note 135, at 270 (arguing that “social 
capital, as understood by Putnam, was an important component in perpetuating 
racial isolation” in southern states). 
177 D. MICHAEL BOTTOMS, AN ARISTOCRACY OF COLOR: RACE AND 
RECONSTRUCTION IN CALIFORNIA AND THE WEST, 1850–1890, at 169–201 
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Historically, social capital enforced many of most pernicious aspects 
of racial subordination, including racial violence, economic deprivation, 
and segregation. Putnam, however, does not completely ignore these is-
sues in his work. Indeed, he devotes a short chapter in Bowling Alone to 
discussing the risk that social capital can lead to harmful outcomes.178 
Moreover, recognizing the terrible injustices of the Progressive Era does 
not require that scholars dismiss the entire time period or fail to consider 
whether it offers important lessons for political organizing.179 Nonethe-
less, the atrocities of this time period counsel against uncritical celebra-
tion and promotion of social capital.180 
Due to the numerous problems that empirical scholars have found 
with Putnam’s work and with similar scholarship, social capital theory 
does not serve as a firm basis for defending the Supreme Court’s retreat 
from group-based equal protection, nor does it justify turning to dignity-
based claims as a suitable replacement. Furthermore, as Part III demon-
strates, social psychologists—who specialize in analyzing group-based 
behavior—offer research that provides a more helpful social context for 
understanding developments in the Court’s racial discrimination doc-
trine. This research also offers empirical justifications for preserving 
group-based identities and equal protection.  
(2013) (discussing violent removal of Chinese from areas of the West Coast 
during the nineteenth century); WILLIAM D. CARRIGAN & CLIVE WEBB, 
FORGOTTEN DEAD: MOB VIOLENCE AGAINST MEXICANS IN THE UNITED STATES, 
1848–1928, at 17–63 (2013) (discussing lynching of Mexicans in Southwest, 
due to racism, economic competition, and territorial clashes); Rennard Strick-
land & William M. Strickland, Tale of Two Marshalls: Reflections on Indian 
Law and Policy, the Cherokee Cases, and the Cruel Irony of Supreme Court 
Victories, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 111 (1994) (discussing ejectment of Cherokee from 
Georgia). 
178 PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 98, at 350–63. 
179 See Robert D. Johnston, Re-Democratizing the Progressive Era: The 
Politics of Progressive Era Political Historiography, 1 J. GILDED AGE & 
PROGRESSIVE ERA 68 (2002) (acknowledging the numerous injustices of the 
Progressive Era but arguing that the time period contains many positive lessons 
regarding political organizing). Problems regarding racial and class hierarchies 
existed within Progressive Era-movements for racial justice as well. See Susan 
D. Carle, Race, Class, and Legal Ethics in the Early NAACP (1910–1920), 20 
L. & HIST. REV. 97 (2002) (discussing how the control of the NAACP by white 
attorneys created conflict between the organization’s goals and the opinions of 
most blacks). 
180 Many contemporary organizations also complicate the blanket assertion 
that social capital helps society. See Boggs, supra note 134, at 286 (discussing 
the “flourishing of small, local groups overflowing” with social capital such as 
“urban gangs, cults, paramilitary militias, and assorted patriarchal movements 
like Promise Keepers, Brotherhood of Aryan Nations, and the Muslim Brother-
hood”). 
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III.   PREVENTING BALKANIZATION OR FACILITATING  
RACIAL DOMINATION? 
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Equal Protection Clause as: 
(1) strongly prohibiting race-based legal remedies except in the narrow-
est circumstances; (2) generally permitting state action that negatively 
impacts historically disadvantaged classes; and (3) only barring discrim-
ination against a few vulnerable classes, while leaving other groups to 
rely upon the political process for redress. The Court justifies these doc-
trinal choices on the grounds that to hold otherwise would lead to bal-
kanization. According to the Court, recognition of group rights or reme-
dies divides society. The budding dignity-based liberty doctrine, by 
contrast, arguably minimizes group conflict or pluralism anxiety because 
it identifies universal interests and does not require group identity as a 
basis for remediation.181  
As an abstract principle, this analysis of Court doctrine seems unre-
markable. Empirically, however, the balkanization rhetoric raises tre-
mendous concerns regarding the Court’s understanding of contemporary 
race relations, the institutional role of the Court, and the purpose of equal 
protection. As this Part demonstrates, the Court’s discarding of the sus-
pect class doctrine and the requirements of colorblindness and discrimi-
natory intent does not avoid social conflict. Instead, the Court’s interpre-
tation of the Equal Protection Clause implements core beliefs that most 
whites hold regarding the status of race in the United States. Relative to 
persons of color, whites prefer colorblindness and oppose multicultural-
ism. Whites also tend to support individualism rather than group-based 
identity and rights. In addition, whites are more likely to believe that 
racism no longer represents a significant obstacle to equal opportunity. 
Finally, whites see themselves as a racially vulnerable class, perhaps 
even more susceptible of discrimination than persons of color. Most 
people of color strenuously disagree with these viewpoints. Accordingly, 
whether by design or effect, the Court’s equal protection doctrine im-
plements many of the core racial viewpoints held by whites and leads to 
the reinforcement of racial inequality. This is a peculiar form of equal 
protection. 
A.   Social Psychology Theories of Group Behavior 
The traditional social capital literature, such as Putnam’s research, 
offers a very limited understanding of group behavior. Other social sci-
ence scholarship, however, provides greater insight regarding the moti-
vation of individuals and groups. Specifically, works of social psycholo-
gists, who have analyzed the dynamics of group behavior for more than 
a century, provide more reliable and accurate material for understanding 
181 See Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 5. 
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how the Court’s equal protection doctrine relates to society.182 Prevailing 
themes in social psychology literature support the argument that the 
Court’s justification for abandoning group-based equal protection mir-
rors the views that most whites have regarding race relations. These 
dominant-group views concerning race differ sharply from those of per-
sons of color. Accordingly, social psychology literature helps demon-
strate that the Court’s equal protection doctrine is white-centric. 
1.   Individualism Is a Social Construct 
Contrary to Court doctrine, social psychology literature does not 
view people as atomistic agents. Instead, the individual and society are 
mutually constitutive. Individuals define themselves within specific so-
cietal contexts; these individual personalities, in turn, help to shape the 
dynamics of larger group culture.183 Empirical research finds that this 
theory holds true even in societies like Western Europe and the United 
States with very strong cultures that emphasize individualism.184 While 
many legal doctrines treat the individual as the main object of civil rights 
law and a well-functioning society, social psychologists view the indi-
vidual and society as inseparable:  
[D]espite the ideology of individualism and the mani-
fold political and legal practices that privilege the indi-
vidual, people are not just autonomous individuals sole-
ly under their own production and orchestration. They 
are also centers of dynamic interpersonal relationships, 
and these relationships are significant in determining 
who they are, who they try to be, and how they behave. 
. . . [I]ncreasingly it is evident that identity is indeed a 
group project.185 
2.   Social Dominance Theory 
Social psychologists have also compiled substantial research regard-
ing group-based inequality. In their influential book Social Dominance, 
psychologists Jim Sidanius and Felicia Pratto find that “all human socie-
182 See generally Dorwin Cartwright, 42 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 82 (1979) (ob-
serving in 1979 that the formal school of social psychology has existed for “ap-
proximately eighty years”).  
183 Hazel Rose Markus & Shinobu Kitayama, Cultures and Selves: A Cycle 
of Mutual Constitution, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI. 420, 421 (2010). 
184 Hazel Rose Markus, Claude M. Steele & Dorothy M. Steele, Color-
blindness as a Barrier to Inclusion: Assimilation and Nonimmigrant Minorities, 
129 DAEDALUS 233, 248 (2000).  
185 Id. Despite the prevalence of individualism discourse in equal protection 
case law, the Court has, in fact, recognized the important connections between 
the individual and society in several cases and doctrines. See infra text accom-
panying notes 305–12. 
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ties tend to be structured as group-based social hierarchies.”186 Diverging 
endowments of social value distinguish dominant and subordinate 
groups.187 Dominant groups possess a “disproportionately large share of 
positive social value” defined as “material and symbolic things for which 
people strive.”188 Subordinate groups, by contrast, “possess a dispropor-
tionately large share of negative social value.”189 Items of positive social 
value include “political authority and power, good and plentiful food, 
splendid homes, the best available health care, wealth, and high social 
status.”190 Negative social value includes things such as “low power and 
social status, high-risk and low-status occupations, relatively poor health 
care, poor food, modest or miserable homes, and severe negative sanc-
tions (e.g., prison and death sentences).”191 Sidanius and Pratto use the 
term “social dominance theory” to describe their conclusions regarding 
social organization.192 
Sidanius and Pratto make two additional observations that shall in-
form this Article’s ensuing discussion of Court doctrine. First, group-
based hierarchies are almost impervious to change.193 Even when egali-
tarian measures help to alleviate the conditions of subordinate groups, 
the relative inequality between subordinate and dominant classes re-
mains the same.194 Second, group-based societies construct “legitimizing 
myths”—or “attitudes, values, beliefs, stereotypes, and ideologies that 
provide moral and intellectual justification” for group-based inequali-
ty.195 
186 JIM SIDANIUS & FELICIA PRATTO, SOCIAL DOMINANCE: AN INTERGROUP 
THEORY OF SOCIAL HIERARCHY AND OPPRESSION 31 (1999). 
187 Id. at 31–32. 
188 Id. at 31. 
189 Id. at 32. 
190 Id. at 31–32. 
191 Id. at 32. Sidanius and Pratto also distinguish group-based from individ-
ual-based social hierarchies. In a group-based hierarchy, individuals in dominant 
groups derive benefits from their membership in the dominant group; in indi-
vidual-based hierarchy, benefits are earned by individual efforts. This distinction 
does not mean that dominant group members do not work to obtain positive 
value. Instead, the distinction emphasizes that individual differences cannot 
explain the disparity in positive social value held by dominant versus subordi-
nate group members. Id. at 32. 
192 Id. at 31. 
193 Id. at 33–39. 
194 Id. at 37 (observing that the social status of blacks increased dramatical-
ly in public opinion polls between 1964 and 1989, but that the relative differ-
ence between white and black status remained virtually unchanged). 
195 Id. at 45. The concept of a legitimizing myth is similar to terms used by 
other social theorists to explain hierarchy-sustaining ideology.  
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B.   Social Psychology Theory and Race Relations 
Researchers have conducted numerous empirical studies that test the 
claims made by Sidanius and Pratto. This research provides great insight 
into the dynamics of United States race relations and the impact of race 
upon Supreme Court doctrine, including equal protection case law. In 
particular, these studies reveal great disparities among the views of 
whites and persons of color regarding the desirability and appropriate-
ness of multiculturalism and cultural pluralism versus colorblindness and 
assimilation; support for individualistic or group-based social models; 
contemporary relevance of race and racism to opportunities for social 
and economic advancement; and substantiality of racial discrimination 
against whites.  
1.   Multiculturalism Versus Colorblindness 
Numerous studies have considered whether race impacts individual 
support for multiculturalism or colorblindness. The results of these stud-
ies are remarkably consistent and clear: generally, whites oppose multi-
culturalism and prefer colorblindness, while persons of color tend to 
support multiculturalism much more than colorblindness.196 The research 
196 See e.g., Evan P. Apfelbaum Samuel R. Sommers, & Michael I. Norton, 
Seeing Race and Seeming Racist? Evaluating Strategic Colorblindness in Social 
Interaction, 95 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 918 (2008) (“Colorblindness 
has emerged as a norm endorsed by many Whites and evident across a wide 
range of domains . . . .”); Alison M. Konrad & Frank Linehan, Race and Sex 
Differences in Line Managers’ Reactions to Equal Employment Opportunity and 
Affirmative Action Interventions, 20 GRP. & ORG. MGMT. 409, 424 (1995) (find-
ing that persons of color and white women were more supportive of “identity-
conscious” hiring practices than white men and that persons of color were more 
supportive of such policies than white women); Markus et al., supra note 184, at 
246 (discussing whites’ preference for assimilation and colorblindness versus 
pluralistic perspective held by persons of color); Victoria C. Plaut Flannery G. 
Garnett, Laura E. Buffardi, & Jeffrey Sanchez-Burks, “What About Me?”: Per-
ceptions of Exclusion and Whites’ Reaction to Multiculturalism, 101 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 337, 339 (2011) (“Although there are certainly 
individual exceptions and wide variation, empirically, dominant racial/ethnic 
group members such as Whites appear to show less support for multiculturalism 
than do minorities.”); Aneeta Rattan & Nalini Ambady, Diversity Ideologies and 
Intergroup Relations: An Examination of Colorblindness and Multiculturalism, 
EURO. J. OF SOC. PSYCHOL. 12, 13–14 (2013) (“The extant research shows that 
majority group members tend to endorse a colorblind ideology to a greater de-
gree than minority group members. . . .”); id. at 14 (“Minority group members 
are less likely to endorse colorblindness than are majority group members. In-
stead, they tend to endorse multiculturalism.”); Carey S. Ryan, Jennifer S. Hunt, 
Joshua A. Weibel, Charles R. Peterson, Juan F. Casas, Multicultural and Color-
blind Ideology, Stereotypes, and Ethnocentrism among Black and White Ameri-
cans, 10 GRP. PROCESSES INTERGROUP REL. 617, 623–24 (2007) (reporting re-
sults of a study finding that “the tendency to endorse multiculturalism more than 
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makes this finding with such a high degree of certainty that it has be-
come a standard working assumption among social psychologists.197  
Researchers have isolated several factors that explain the differing 
views among whites and persons of color regarding colorblindness and 
multiculturalism. First, some researchers have found that whites believe 
multiculturalism does not include them.198 Others have observed that 
whites, particularly those who strongly support social dominance, op-
pose multiculturalism because they believe it threatens whites’ higher 
social status.199 Some studies connect whites’ opposition to multicultur-
colorblindness was greater among Black than White participants” and that 
“White participants more strongly endorsed a colorblind ideology than did 
Blacks” and that “Black participants more strongly endorsed a multicultural 
than a colorblind ideology”); Maykel Verkuyten, Ethnic Group Identification 
and Group Evaluation Among Minority and Majority Groups: Testing the Multi-
culturalism Hypothesis, J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 121, 134 (2005) 
(discussing results of a study in the Netherlands that finds greater support for 
multiculturalism among Turkish minority participants and more support for as-
similation among Dutch majority participants); Maykel Verkuyten, Social Psy-
chology and Multiculturalism, 1 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 280, 
283 (2007) [hereinafter Verkuyten, Social Psychology and Multiculturalism] 
(“Empirical studies on multicultural attitudes indicate that the general support 
for multiculturalism is not very strong among majority groups in many Western 
countries.”); Christopher Wolsko, Bernadette Park & Charles M. Judd, Consid-
ering the Tower of Babel: Correlates of Assimilation and Multiculturalism 
among Ethnic Minority and Majority Groups in the United States, 19 SOC. JUST. 
RES. 277, 301 (2006) (reporting “clear patterns of divergence between the atti-
tudes of whites and ethnic minorities,” including greater support for multicul-
turalism and lesser support for assimilation among minority groups, relative to 
whites). One study makes a more tentative claim than others. See Jack Citrin, 
David O. Sears, Christopher Muste & Cara Wong, Multiculturalism in American 
Public Opinion, 31 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 247, 266 (2001) (“The tendency of minori-
ty groups to be more favourable towards multiculturalism than whites is present, 
but surprisingly modest.”). 
197 See sources cited supra note 196 (citing abundant scholarly support for 
the contention that whites favor colorblindness and assimilation more than per-
sons of color and that persons of color prefer race-consciousness and multicul-
turalism more than whites). 
198 Plaut et al., supra note 196, at 349 (finding that whites feel excluded 
from multiculturalism but not colorblindness); Rattan & Ambady, supra note 
196, at 14 (discussing whites’ feelings of exclusion from multiculturalism). 
199 Lawrence Bobo, Race, Interests, and Beliefs About Affirmative Action, 
41 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 985, 997 (1998) (finding that “group-based interests” 
explain, in part, white opposition to affirmative action); Christopher M. Federi-
co & Jim Sidanius, Racism, Ideology, and Affirmative Action Revisited: The 
Antecedents and Consequences of “Principled Objections” to Affirmative Ac-
tion, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 488, 499 (2002) (finding that support 
for group dominance among whites explains white opposition to affirmative 
action directly and indirectly—by influencing whether whites accept purported-
ly principled policy arguments used to oppose affirmative action); Brian S. 
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alism and support for colorblindness to their ideological and political 
views regarding policies such as affirmative action. 200 These studies, in 
turn, find that a number of variables correlate with or cause white oppo-
sition to affirmative action, including racism, principled policy argu-
ments, and the framing of the policy in public discourse (e.g., as a quota 
or preference versus training and outreach).201 
2.   Groups Versus Individuals 
Whites also tend to have a social orientation that denies group dif-
ferences and stresses individualism, while persons of color support poli-
cies that emphasize group differences and experiences.202 This conclu-
sion relates to race-based differences regarding the attractiveness of 
multiculturalism or colorblindness. Colorblindness, which whites prefer 
more than persons of color, treats “group differences” as “largely super-
ficial” or “not substantial enough to warrant a claim on public policy or 
social organization.”203 People of color, by contrast, are more likely to 
support multiculturalism, which “holds that ethnic and racial variety is 
pleasing and important, both to the various groups themselves and to 
society as a whole—so important, in fact, that it can and should be cele-
brated.”204 
3.   Contemporary Relevance of Racism 
Statistical studies consistently find vast disparities among the social 
and economic well-being of whites and persons of color.205 Despite the 
pervasiveness of substantive racial inequality, whites tend to believe that 
Lowery, Mighuel M. Unzueta, Eric D. Knowles & Phillip Atiba Goff, Concern 
for the In-Group and Opposition to Affirmative Action, 90 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 961, 970 (finding that white opposition to affirmative action 
increases if they believe it threatens their group status); C. Lausanne Renfro, 
Walter G. Stephan, Anne Duran & Dennis L. Clason, The Role of Threat in Atti-
tudes Toward Affirmative Action and Its Beneficiaries, 36 J. APP. SOC. PSYCHOL. 
41, 68 (2006) (finding higher opposition to affirmative action among whites 
who believe that such policies threaten their economic and political power, 
among other things); Verkuyten, Social Psychology and Multiculturalism, supra 
note 196, at 284 (arguing that some whites believe that multiculturalism threat-
ens their group’s dominance). 
200 Hillary Haley & Jim Sidanius, The Positive and Negative Framing of Af-
firmative Action: A Group Dominance Perspective, 10 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 656, 666 (2006) (discussing framing effects); Renfro et al., 
supra note 199, at 69 (discussing relevance of racism and conservative ideolo-
gy). 
201 See sources cited supra note 200. 
202 Markus et al., supra note 184, at 243–49. 
203 Id. at 243. 
204 Id. at 244. See also id. at 246 (discussing surveys showing racial differ-
ences in support for colorblindness and multiculturalism). 
205 Id. at 242. 
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equal opportunity exists in the United States regardless of race; people of 
color, however, typically disagree with this position.206 Whites’ propensi-
ty to believe that racism no longer matters could operate as a legitimiz-
ing myth, designed to validate the unequal distribution of power and re-
sources among persons of color and whites.207 If racism no longer exists, 
then any measurable inequality does not result from unfairness, which 
might require legislative and judicial remediation. Instead, individual 
weaknesses among persons of color or other nonracial variables must 
explain contemporary racial inequality. From this perspective, remedia-
tion is a privilege or special benefit. 
Denying the existence of racism could also stem from a psychologi-
cal mechanism described as “system justification.”208 System justifica-
tion refers to “the psychological process by which existing social ar-
rangements are legitimized, even at the expense of personal and group 
interest.”209 If individuals convince themselves that existing social ar-
rangements are just, then they will find no need for remedial policies.210 
206 Elijah Anderson, Duke W. Austin, Craig Lapriece Holloway & Vani S. 
Kulkarni, The Legacy of Racial Caste: An Exploratory Ethnography, 642 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 25, 37 (2012) (summarizing different 
views whites and blacks hold with respect to the contemporary significance of 
racism); Richard P. Eibach & Thomas Keegan, Free at Last? Social Dominance, 
Loss Aversion, and White and Black Americans’ Differing Assessments of Racial 
Progress, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 453, 453 (discussing opinion 
polls showing dramatic difference between black and white opinions regarding 
the existence of racial discrimination); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Racial Ex-
haustion, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 918, 919 n.4 (2009) [hereinafter Hutchinson, 
Racial Exhaustion] (citing numerous studies finding dramatic differences 
among whites and persons of color regarding the ongoing significance of race). 
207 See Roger L. Worthington, Michael Loewy, Rachel L. Navarro & Jeni 
Hart, Color-Blind Racial Attitudes, Social Dominance Orientation, Racial-
Ethnic Group Membership and College Students’ Perceptions of Campus Cli-
mate, 1 J. DIV. HIGHER EDUC. 8, 16 (2008) (finding that white students who 
support social dominance have a more positive perception of “general campus 
climate” than egalitarian whites). 
208 John T. Jost & Mahzarin R. Banaji, The Role of Stereotyping in System-
Justification and the Production of False Consciousness, 33 BRIT. J. SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 1, 2 (1994). 
209 Id. at 2. See also Cheryl J. Wakslak, John T. Jost, Tom R. Tyler & Em-
meline S. Chen, Moral Outrage Mediates the Dampening Effect of System Justi-
fication on Support for Redistributive Social Policies, 18 PSYCHOL. SCI. 267, 
267 (2007) (“According to system-justification theory, people adopt ideologies 
and belief systems that serve as excuses and justifications for existing social, 
economic, and political arrangements at least in part to make themselves feel 
better about the status quo.”) (citation omitted). 
210 See Wakslak, supra note 209, at 273 (“We assume that people care about 
justice, at least to some degree, and are bothered by potential departures from 
fairness. In order to maintain their perceptions of the world as just, however, 
people do not necessarily strive to make changes that will increase the overall 
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In fact, they might even believe that remedial action is unfair.211 System 
justification, however, does not rest upon a desire for group dominance. 
Instead, it reflects a human need to believe that the society in which one 
lives operates fairly.212 
4.   Whites Are a Vulnerable Social Group 
Within the United States, whites began criticizing policies taken to 
ameliorate the conditions of racial inequality immediately after the Civil 
War and throughout the period of Reconstruction.213 Opponents of reme-
dial policies and civil rights statutes argued that these efforts treated 
whites unfairly and transformed blacks into a special and privileged 
class.214 This rhetoric of “racial exhaustion”—whites’ weariness with 
racial redress—has continued over the course of American history.215 
Whites who opposed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 argued that it would 
force employers to utilize quotas and that it would deprive whites of lib-
erty.216 Also, whites have frequently contested affirmative action on the 
grounds that it constitutes unfair discrimination against whites.217  
Although the idea that remedying racial discrimination harms whites 
has informed civil rights debates throughout history, recent studies indi-
cate that whites now feel that they are just as vulnerable to racism as per-
sons of color—or even to a greater extent. In 2011, Michael Norton and 
Samuel Sommers published a study that found that whites believe they 
are a vulnerable racial group.218 Norton and Sommers polled a national 
sample of blacks and whites and asked them to rate on a scale of one to 
ten (one representing “not at all” and ten representing “very much”) the 
amount of discrimination they believe blacks and whites experienced in 
each decade from the 1950s to the 2000s.219  
amount of fairness and equality in the system. Rather, they often engage in cog-
nitive adjustments that preserve a distorted image of reality in which the world 
is a fair and just place.”). 
211 Michael I. Norton & Samuel R. Sommers, Whites See Racism as a Zero-
Sum Game That They Are Now Losing, 6 PERSP. PSYCHOL. SCI. 215, 217 (2011) 
(finding that from 1950s to 2000s and within each decade during this period, 
“White respondents were more likely to see decreases in bias against Blacks as 
related to increases in bias against Whites—consistent with a zero sum view of 
racism among Whites—whereas Blacks were less likely to see the two as 
linked.”). 
212 Wakslak, supra note 209, at 273. 
213 Hutchinson, Racial Exhaustion, supra note 206, at 928–41. 
214 See id. 
215 See generally id. 
216 See id. at 950–53. 
217 Id. at 953–58. 
218 Norton & Sommers, supra note 211. 
219 Id. at 216. 
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The study found that blacks believe antiblack racism has declined 
slightly over time.220 Blacks, however, do not believe that whites have 
experienced racism to a substantial degree; this position remained virtu-
ally unchanged in each rated decade.221 Whites, by contrast, believe that 
antiblack racism has declined sharply, while antiwhite racism has in-
creased dramatically—particularly since the 1970s.222 The study con-
trolled for the age and education of participants, but it found no statisti-
cally significant changes in the results.223 Also, the study found that 
black and white assessments of antiblack and antiwhite racism were 
quite similar for earlier decades, but that the measures diverged dramati-
cally from the 1960s and beyond.224 A majority of white participants be-
lieve that by the 2000s, antiwhite racism became more prevalent than 
antiblack racism.225  
Norton and Sommers also found that whites who believe that they 
are members of a vulnerable social group are more likely to view racial 
equality gains as unfair benefits earned at their expense.226 In other 
words, many whites view racism as a zero-sum game; changing the sta-
tus quo of racial inequality can only occur by treating whites unfairly.227 
C.   The Supreme Court’s Equal Protection Doctrine Mirrors  
White Viewpoints Regarding Race 
The analysis in the preceding section demonstrates that as a class, 
whites tend to favor colorblindness over multiculturalism, embrace indi-
vidualistic rather than group-based models of social organization, be-
lieve that equal opportunity exists in the United States regardless of race, 
and feel that they are a vulnerable racial group. This section demon-
strates that the Supreme Court’s equal protection doctrine mirrors white 
opinion regarding the status of race relations in the United States. Be-
cause this Article has already analyzed the Court’s equal protection doc-
trine in extended detail, demonstrating the congruence of white view-
points and Court doctrine does not require a lengthy analysis. The 
similarities are striking. 
220 Id. 
221 Id. 
222 Id. 
223 Id. 
224 Id. 
225 Id. 
226 Id. at 217. 
227 Id.; see also Eibach & Keegan, supra note 206, at 464 (“Cumulatively, 
these studies support the argument that the discrepancy between White and non-
White assessments of racial progress results, in part, from the tendency of some 
White Americans to frame advances for racial minorities as threats to their own 
status and privilege or, in other words, to their ingroup’s social dominance.”). 
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1.   Multiculturalism Versus Colorblindness 
The Court, like whites, prefers colorblindness to multiculturalism 
and race-conscious decision making. Colorblindness is, in fact, the cen-
tral standard the Court applies in equal protection cases.228 The Court has 
refused to apply other theories, such as antisubordination, that legal 
scholars have developed.229 The Court has never confronted the reality 
that its discussion of social tension within the context of affirmative ac-
tion and other forms of remedial race-conscious state action responds 
primarily to whites’ opinions regarding these policies.230  
2.   Groups Versus Individuals 
The Court, like whites, rejects group-based social models. The Court 
has repeatedly held that the Constitution protects individual, rather than 
group, rights. The Court has also held that recognition of racial groups 
disrupts social cohesion. Consequently, the Court views group-based 
remediation, such as affirmative action, with extreme skepticism.231 The 
Court’s aversion to group-based equal protection also explains its failure 
to recognize a new suspect class since 1977.232 
3.   Contemporary Relevance of Racism 
Although the Supreme Court has never said that racism no longer 
exists, several opinions rest on the implicit understanding that the United 
States is a post-racial society. First, the Court has made remedying racial 
discrimination the most difficult basis for using affirmative action. When 
state actors make racial distinctions in order to remedy discrimination, 
the Court demands exacting evidence of disparate treatment. Otherwise, 
the policy will fail the strict scrutiny test.233 In Adarand Constructors v. 
Peña, the Court held that a federal statute’s rebuttable presumption that 
minority businesses face social disadvantages must satisfy the strict scru-
tiny test.234 The Court’s ruling implies that discrimination against racial 
228 See supra text accompanying notes 41–56. 
229 See infra text accompanying notes 327–30. 
230 See S. Siegel, Race-Conscious Student Assignment Plans, supra note 5 
(“Another difficulty is that the same use of racial criteria may cause race-based 
hostility to increase among members of one racial group and to decrease among 
members of another racial group. For example, an affirmative action program 
may cause more resentment among some whites but less resentment among 
some minorities than would exist in the absence of the program. No decision 
rule is available to explain how the Court’s judgment about balkanization pro-
ceeds in these circumstances.”). 
231 See supra text accompanying notes 41–56. 
232 See Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 5, at 755. 
233 See Hutchinson, Inversion of Privilege and Subordination, supra note 3, 
at 675–77 (discussing the Court’s distrust of legislative findings of discrimina-
tion). 
234 See 515 U.S. 200, 200 (1995). 
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minorities occurs rarely, if at all, and that individual businesses must 
demonstrate on a case-by-case basis the relevance of race to economic 
activity.235 
Similarly, in Parents Involved, a plurality of the Court found that the 
racial isolation of people of color in public schools does not justify race-
based remedies. The Court reached this conclusion by narrowly defining 
discrimination in procedural terms. Conditions of racial inequality—
even if they result from state policies—simply do not constitute racial 
discrimination. According to the plurality, the only discrimination the 
case implicated was the defendants’ efforts to create a more egalitarian 
distribution of education resources. Thus, Chief Justice Roberts chides 
the dissenters by reminding them that “[t]he way to stop discrimination 
on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”236 This 
sterile tautology validates pervasive patterns of inequality that negatively 
impact students of color. On the other hand, race-remedial policies re-
ceive the most rigorous judicial scrutiny to make sure that the state ac-
tors do not victimize whites.  
In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy sought to distance himself 
from the conservative plurality. Kennedy argued that states have a com-
pelling interest to end the racial isolation of students of color.237 Kenne-
dy, however, voted to invalidate the policies due to the dignity harms 
they imposed upon white students.238 Kennedy did not sufficiently con-
sider the significance of the alleged dignity harms whites suffer from 
racial classification versus the concrete material harms that students of 
color experience because they attend racially isolated poverty schools.239 
Although Kennedy tried to carve out a middle ground, his resolution 
placed the interests of whites above the needs of students of color. 
The Court has even advanced the interest of states’ “dignity” above 
the needs of persons of color. In Shelby County v. Holder, the Supreme 
Court invalidated the preclearance requirements contained in Section 5 
of the Voting Rights Act.240 The preclearance provision mandated that 
235 See Spann, supra note 23, at 52 (“The reason that the Supreme Court re-
jected the congressional presumption is that the Court has adopted a theoretical 
vision of the world, where racial minorities are not disadvantaged.”). 
236 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 
748 (2007). 
237 Id. at 783. 
238 Id. at 797 (“To be forced to live under a state-mandated racial label is in-
consistent with the dignity of individuals in our society.”). 
239 See generally Gary Orfield and Chungmei Lee, Why Segregation Mat-
ters: Poverty and Educational Inequality, THE CIV. RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD 
UNIV.(2005), http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integrati 
on-and-diversity/why-segregation-matters-poverty-and-educational-inequality/o 
rfield-why-segregation-matters-2005.pdf (discussing the negative educational 
impact of poverty and racial isolation).  
240 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (finding current standards for 42 U.S.C. §1973(a) 
to be an impermissible intrusion upon state sovereign immunity).  
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certain states and jurisdictions within other states receive approval from 
the U.S. Department of Justice before they made any changes to their 
election laws.241 Congress enacted this provision because these jurisdic-
tions were among the worst offenders of the Fifteenth Amendment at the 
time the Voting Rights Act was enacted.242 Congress renewed the Voting 
Rights Act in 2006.243 At that time, several lawmakers and public com-
mentators questioned the usefulness of Section 5, arguing that the cov-
ered states no longer discriminated on the basis of race.244 Perennial civil 
rights opponents Abigail Thernstrom and Edward Blum offered a per-
spective that Justice Scalia would later repeat during oral arguments sev-
en years later, when they effectively described Section 5 as a handout to 
a special interest group. Thernstrom and Blum pleaded with Congress 
not to surrender to “Jesse Jackson and other activists eager to wave the 
racism flag” and that congressional Republicans are “terrified by . . . the 
NAACP, the Lawyers Committee on Civil Rights, and other advocacy 
groups.”245 During oral arguments, Justice Scalia, following the lead of 
Thernstrom and Blum, infamously described the preclearance provision 
as a “racial entitlement,” rather than a sorely needed measure to prevent 
ongoing racial discrimination.246 Because Justice Scalia either doubts or 
does not care that race continues to harm persons of color, he construes 
Section 5 as a naked racial privilege that injures states rather than offer-
ing necessary protection to vulnerable classes.247  
The Shelby County opinion makes similar claims about the irrele-
vance of race. Justice Roberts, who also wrote the plurality opinion in 
Parents Involved, argued that the Voting Rights Act “imposes current 
241 Id. at 2615.  
242 Christopher S. Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2: Of Biased Votes, 
Unconstitutional Elections, and Common Law Statutes, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 377, 
383 (2012) (“Section 5, the VRA’s other core provision, reaches only ‘covered 
jurisdictions’ (states and some localities that once had particularly egregious 
records of voting discrimination) and guards primarily against backsliding.” 
(citation omitted)). 
243 Abigail Thernstrom, Redistricting in Today’s Shifting Racial Landscape, 
23 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 373, 393 (“In 2006 Congress once again substantially 
rewrote section 5.”). 
244 See Hutchinson, Racial Exhaustion, supra note 206; infra text accompa-
nying notes 298–311. 
245 Hutchinson, Racial Exhaustion, supra note 206 (quoting Abigail 
Thernstrom & Edward Blum, Do the Right Thing, WALL ST. J., July 15, 2005, at 
A10). 
246 Adam Liptak, Voting Rights Law Draws Skepticism From Justices, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 27, 2013 (“Justice Antonin Scalia said the law, once a civil rights 
landmark, now amounted to a ‘perpetuation of racial entitlement.’”). 
247 Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (invoking a principle 
of “a union of States, equal in power, dignity and authority” as controlling prec-
edent (citing Coyle v. Smith, 221 U. S. 559, 567 (1911)).  
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burdens and must be justified by current needs.”248 Echoing the senti-
ments of white participants in a recent study regarding the status of Unit-
ed States race relations from the 1950s until the present, Chief Justice 
Roberts wrote that “things have changed dramatically” since the enact-
ment of the Voting Rights Act in 1965.249 The contention of dramatic 
racial progress, however, reflects majoritarian views held by whites—not 
persons of color.250  
The Court also held that because voter turnout in the covered states 
has increased substantially, the preclearance formula needs revision.251 
The Court, however, fails to consider the numerous laws that primarily 
Republican-controlled states, including some subject to preclearance, 
have enacted to deprive people of color of the right to vote. These poli-
cies include voter ID laws, permissive use of poll watchers who can in-
timidate persons of color and language minorities, the use of purging 
lists that disparately impact persons of color, and felon disenfranchise-
ment.252 Immediately after the Court enjoined the preclearance provi-
sion, several Republican-controlled state legislatures introduced bills that 
would enact new provisions that scholars believe could disparately im-
pact persons of color.253 While the Court portrays Section 5 as outmoded 
because of dramatic improvement in race-relations, the legislative blitz 
following the Shelby County decision undermines the Court’s forgiving 
analysis of contemporary racism.  
If racism was actually negligible in contemporary America, then 
Shelby County would arguably contain a defensible doctrine. However, 
because racism remains pervasive in the United States, Shelby County 
rests on a fictitious vision of contemporary United States race relations. 
The case also mirrors the views held by most whites today: racism is a 
248 Id. (quoting Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 
557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009)). 
249 Id. 
250 Supra text accompanying notes 205–12. 
251 Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (“In the covered jurisdictions, ‘[v]oter 
turnout and registration rates now approach parity. Blatantly discriminatory eva-
sions of federal decrees are rare. And minority candidates hold office at unprec-
edented levels.’” (quoting Northwest Austin, 557 U.S. at 202)). 
252 Jesse Allen, Documentary Disenfranchisement, 86 TUL. L. REV. 389 
(2011) (discussing methods of felon disenfranchisement); Jocelyn Friedrichs 
Benson, Voter Fraud or Voter Defrauded? Highlighting an Inconsistent Consid-
eration of Election Fraud, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2009) (discussing 
voter purge lists); Gilda Daniels, Voter Deception, 43 IND. L. REV. 343 (2010) 
(discussing forms of voter harassment); Daniel Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: 
Where Election Reform Meets the Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689 (2006) 
(discussing methods of vote denial). 
253 Michael Cooper, After Ruling, States Rush to Enact Voting Laws, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 5, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/06/us/politics/after-
Supreme-Court-ruling-states-rush-to-enact-voting-laws.html?pagewanted=all&_ 
r=0. 
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thing of the past, and the nation has virtually ended all racism through 
the extension of civil rights to people of color.254 In a post-racial society, 
civil rights enforcement and remedies are unnecessary and should be 
rare, narrow, and discrete.  
4.   Whites Are a Vulnerable Social Group 
The Court also treats whites as a vulnerable social group. Although 
persuasive arguments justify applying a more lenient standard to evalu-
ate the constitutionality of remedial state action that treats whites differ-
ently than persons of color, the Court applies strict scrutiny to such poli-
cies. At the same time, however, the Court applies ordinary rational basis 
review to state action that disparately harms disadvantaged groups, in-
cluding when these policies occur in policy areas such as education and 
criminal justice that served as historical sites of pernicious racial subor-
dination.255  
Furthermore, while the Court imposes an exacting intent standard 
upon historically disadvantaged plaintiffs, it has shown a greater will-
ingness to find unlawful discrimination in cases brought by white plain-
tiffs.256 In Ricci v. DeStefano, the Court held that a municipal govern-
ment’s decision to cancel the use of a test used to screen applicants for a 
promotion in the city’s fire department violated Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.257 Even though the test results would have excluded 
all black candidates and all but two Latino candidates from the field of 
qualified individuals, the Court held that scrapping the test would dis-
criminate against whites.258  
Title VII, however, contains an impact standard, and the city argued 
that using the test might make the city susceptible to lawsuits.259 The 
Court, however, held that the city needed a “strong basis in evidence” for 
believing that using the test would make it vulnerable to lawsuits filed 
by persons of color, that it could replace the initial test with one that had 
a smaller discriminatory impact, and that the initial test was not a valid 
254 Supra text accompanying notes 204–212. 
255 Hutchinson, Inversion of Privilege and Subordination, supra note 3, at 
664. 
256 Reva Siegel, Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1, 51–58 (2013) 
[hereinafter R. Siegel, Equality Divided] (discussing inconsistent application of 
the discriminatory intent requirement).  
257 557 U.S. 557 (2009) (finding violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–
2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2009)). Although Ricci is a Title VII case, rather than an equal 
protection case, the Court finds intentional discrimination (which is the equal 
protection standard), and the defendant is a state actor. Also, the Court analogiz-
es this case to equal protection litigation. Thus, it fits within the general scope of 
this Article. See also Ricci, 557 U.S. at 582–93. 
258 Id. 
259 Id. at 563–74 (discussing test and city’s decision to discard the results). 
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job requirement.260 The extreme disparate effect and the various meet-
ings and legal discussions the city held concerning the test failed to meet 
that standard.261 The white plaintiffs, however, prevailed on their claim 
of intentional discrimination, despite the fact that hiring and promotion 
criteria that disparately impact racial groups, absent some legitimate rea-
son, can constitute unlawful discrimination under federal law.262 Fur-
thermore, the white plaintiffs proved intentional discrimination by rely-
ing primarily upon the same statistical pattern of discrimination that the 
city used to justify discarding the test.263 The Court chose to extend 
greater protection to the white victims of alleged discrimination than it 
provided to the black and Latino employees the city tried to shield from 
the test’s discriminatory impact. The Court also provided more protec-
tion to white plaintiffs than it typically extends to persons of color liti-
gating mere impact claims.264 The Court found intentional discrimination 
relying almost exclusively on statistical evidence. This is a great depar-
ture from the normal discriminatory intent rule cases. In most discrimi-
natory intent rule cases, the plaintiffs are persons of color; in Ricci, vir-
tually all of the plaintiffs were white.  
The discriminatory intent rule, the Court’s application of strict scru-
tiny to remedial usages of race, and its refusal to find any new suspect 
classes, support the observation that the Court has “inverted” the mean-
ing of equal protection.265 The Court now extends greater protection to 
privileged classes, such as whites, than it provides to vulnerable classes, 
such as persons of color.266 Or, as Siegel contends, the Court’s equal pro-
tection doctrine has become “majority-protective.”267 
Even assuming that the Court should use a uniform standard for all 
racial discrimination claims, the Court has not defended why it should 
provide greater protection to whites than it gives to persons of color. 
260 Id. at 582–94. 
261 Id. 
262 Id. at 581–85 (conceding disparate impact liability under Title VII but 
requiring very high burden on city to establish a strong basis that the lawsuit 
would be compelling). 
263 Id. at 579 (“All the evidence demonstrates that the City chose not to cer-
tify the examination results because of the statistical disparity based on race— 
i.e., how minority candidates had performed when compared to white candi-
dates.”) (emphasis added).  
264 See supra text accompanying notes 256–58. 
265 See Hutchinson, Inversion of Privilege and Subordination, supra note 3 
(arguing that the Court has inverted the concepts of privilege and subordination 
and that it provides the greatest judicial protection for dominant classes and 
sends subordinate groups to the political process); see also R. Siegel, Equality 
Divided, supra note 256, at 29–59 (discussing “majority-protective” equal pro-
tection). 
266 See Hutchinson, Inversion of Privilege and Subordination, supra note 3. 
267 Siegel, Equal Divided, supra note 256, at 29–58 (discussing “majority-
protective” equal protection). 
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Although no statistical measure of social and economic well-being sup-
ports the argument that whites suffer from racial oppression, a recent 
study shows that whites now believe that they experience discrimination 
more frequently than blacks.268 Whether the result of intentional or unin-
tended processes, the Court’s equal protection case law reflects this inde-
fensible belief that antiwhite oppression exists in the United States. 
Although the Court’s equal protection doctrine offers little hope to 
vulnerable social groups, some plaintiffs have successfully asserted dig-
nity-based claims to challenge harmful state action. Despite the possible 
positive outcomes in these cases, legal scholars must critically examine 
the relative strengths and weaknesses of dignity doctrines versus a robust 
equal protection analysis. As the next Part of this Article demonstrates, 
dignity-based claims cannot provide the same level of redress to vulner-
able groups as an equal protection doctrine that seeks to mitigate rather 
than facilitate racial hierarchy.  
IV.   TOWARDS A “NEWER” EQUAL PROTECTION THAT PROTECTS 
SUBORDINATE CLASSES 
This Part argues for the development of a newer equal protection. In 
light of the informative empirical research conducted by social psy-
chologists, this equal protection doctrine would accommodate group 
identity and rights. It would not conflate race consciousness with racism 
or argue that the former causes social unrest. The revised equal protec-
tion doctrine this Article advocates would recognize the ongoing signifi-
cance of racism and its impact upon persons of color. This equal protec-
tion analysis would not treat whites as a racially subordinate class—a 
finding that lacks an empirical basis. Finally, the doctrine developed in 
this Part would not enforce the perspectives of whites as a class over 
those of persons of color, or of any dominant class over subordinate 
groups. In other words, this newer equal protection doctrine would not 
facilitate group domination, as does the Court’s current case law. 
A.   Groups, Difference, and Society 
The Court asserts that its reluctance to recognize group-based ine-
quality stems from its fear of balkanization. Yoshino’s groundbreaking 
work on this subject contends that the Court and society suffer from 
“pluralism anxiety.”269 Assuming Yoshino’s diagnosis is correct, fear of 
balkanization does not justify the Court’s retreat from group-based equal 
protection.  
268 Norton & Sommers, supra note 209, at 216.  
269 See Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 5. 
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1.   Healthy Responses to Anxiety 
Anxiety has two meanings. The first meaning is used in conversa-
tional English, while the second meaning has a clinical dimension. Both 
the clinical and nonclinical uses of the word “anxiety” derive from and 
connote physical and emotional pain related to some generalized or 
amorphous threat.270 Psychiatrists Juan J. López-Ibor and María-Inés 
López-Ibor have written quite an extensive article discussing the ety-
mology and present-day meaning of anxiety.271 They chart the evolution 
of the term through Greek, Latin, French, and English employing nu-
merous historical sources.272 After a substantial analysis, they conclude 
that: 
The word anxiety and those that share the same Lat-
in and Greek etymology describe feelings characterized 
by deep suffering experienced as being at risk by a not-
yet-identified threat. The emotion is linked to sensations 
of choking, oppression in the chest, lack of breath which 
allow us to differentiate anxiety from anguish, and the 
sensation of being inhibited (as in anguish) from that of 
being uneasy or nervous (as in anxiety). Anxiety is not 
only a clinical symptom of many psychiatric disturb-
ances, but also a radical experience of human beings as 
substantiated by phenomenological and existentialist 
schools of thought, which consider that anguish is the 
experience of being thrown into the world.273 
Medical professionals typically recommend psychological therapy to 
control the irrational and panicked reaction to ordinary stimuli.274 In ex-
treme cases, pharmacological intervention combined with therapy offers 
promise.275 Medical studies, however, report that cognitive avoidance, or 
efforts to escape anxiety by ignoring the stressor, can actually make con-
ditions worse. People who utilize cognitive avoidance simply add on a 
new layer of anxiety: they now worry about avoiding the stressor in ad-
270 See generally Juan J. López-Ibor & María-Inés López-Ibor, Anxiety and 
Logos: Toward a Linguistic Analysis of the Origins of Human Thinking, 120 J. 
AFFECTIVE DISORDERS 1 (2010) (discussing etymology of anxiety). 
271 Id. 
272 Id. 
273 Id. at 10. 
274 Richard G. Heimberg, Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy for Social Anxiety 
Disorder: Current Status and Future Directions, 51 SOC’Y BIOLOGICAL 
PSYCHIATRY 101 (2002) (discussing effectiveness of cognitive behavioral thera-
py for patients with social anxiety disorder). 
275 Herman G. M. Westenberg & Michael R. Liebowitz, Overview of Panic 
and Social Anxiety Disorders, 65 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY (Supp. 14) 22, 24 
(2004) (concluding that combination therapy and medication might help treat 
prolonged cases of social anxiety disorder). 
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dition to experiencing the same anxiety that triggered their avoidance 
strategies.276 If Yoshino’s anxiety trope is accurate, the Court’s and socie-
ty’s efforts to avoid racial and ethnic pluralism actually may cause more 
serious harm than accepting the multicultural reality of the United States.  
Although this discussion of clinical anxiety is intended as a meta-
phor—just as Yoshino’s use of the term—contemporary equal protection 
doctrine, like cognitive avoidance strategies, does not confront actual 
societal conditions. Instead, the Court has created a doctrine that rests on 
a fictitious portrayal of the United States as a society in which whites are 
racially oppressed; multiculturalism is corrosive; group-rights have no 
constitutional foundation; and race-based remedies impose the same de-
gree of harm as Jim Crow and slavery. This doctrine does not come close 
to providing equal justice. The Court must try a different approach.  
A fair equal protection doctrine would rest on empirical research, ra-
ther than disproven assertions regarding the status of United States race 
relations. The Court should reform equal protection to recognize the 
benefits of multiculturalism and harms of colorblindness; inevitability of 
a group-based social structure; persistence of racism against persons of 
color; and the privileges whites possess in a racially hierarchical society.  
2.   Multiculturalism Helps Society; Colorblindness Harms Society 
Although the Court fears balkanization, empirical research demon-
strates that ethnic and racial diversity improves social institutions and 
helps to generate mutual understanding and tolerance across social 
groups. Some social capital literature, which some scholars and advo-
cates have used to justify the demise of group-based equal protection, 
actually finds that multiculturalism generates many social benefits.277 To 
the extent that some scholars contend that multiculturalism causes inter-
group tension, a much larger number of scholars have refuted this asser-
tion or found that other factors like racial and class inequality more 
strongly correlate with or cause intergroup tension.278 Controlling for 
these other factors, multiculturalism has very little negative impact upon 
social cohesion.279 
Social psychologists have conducted studies that find that whites 
have a more favorable view of out-groups when they embrace multicul-
turalism.280 By contrast, colorblindness helps to justify the existing une-
276 Stefan G. Hofmann, Cognitive Factors that Maintain Social Anxiety 
Disorder: A Comprehensive Model and its Treatment Implications, 36 
COGNITIVE BEHAV. THERAPY 193, 204 (2007) (finding that a coping strategy 
that avoids source of anxiety actually exacerbates the symptoms of the disor-
der). 
277 See supra text accompanying notes 152–66. 
278 See supra text accompanying notes 152–69.  
279 See supra text accompanying notes 152–54, 165–66. 
280 See Christopher Wolsko, Bernadette Park, Charles M. Judd & Bernd 
Wittenbrink, Framing Interethnic Ideology: Effects of Multicultural and Color-
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qual distribution of vital resources.281 Colorblindness operates as a legit-
imizing myth that defends social dominance and as a form of system 
justification that convinces individuals that the United States is a just 
society—in spite of deep racial inequality.282  
Colorblindness can also make people blind to racism. Researchers 
conducted a study that exposed two groups of students to a “multimedia” 
storybook.283 The book—which consisted of a series of images displayed 
on computers with a narrator—described a third-grade student’s effort to 
arrange a class performance to support racial equality.284 The two groups 
of students heard the same story, except that the scripts diverged in one 
critical respect. One group of students received a lecture regarding the 
virtues of colorblindness.285 The other group of children listened to a 
lecture that promoted the recognition and appreciation of ethnic and ra-
cial diversity.286 A teacher, unaware of the study, then read three scenari-
os to all of the students. These three scenarios involved student interac-
tions that were nonracist, ambiguously racist, and explicitly racist.287 The 
explicitly racist story involved an incident of racist bullying during a 
soccer game.288 Researchers asked the students to describe the events 
they heard and to state whether any of the three scenarios involved acts 
of racial discrimination. The students’ responses confirm the hypothesis 
that the promotion of colorblindness can lead to racism-blindness.289  
Blind Perspectives on Judgments of Groups and Individuals, 78 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 635, 648–49 (2000) (finding that multiculturalism causes a 
more positive perception of out-groups among whites). 
281 See Kimberly Rios Morrison, Victoria C. Plaut & Oscar Ybarra, Predict-
ing Whether Multiculturalism Positively or Negatively Influences White Ameri-
cans’ Intergroup Attitudes: The Role of Ethnic Identification, 36 PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1648, 1658 (2010) (“Furthermore, colorblind ideolo-
gies may reinforce the status quo by legitimating existing inequalities between 
White Americans and racial and ethnic minorities.”) (citations omitted). 
282 See supra text accompanying notes 204–07. 
283 Evan P. Apfelbaum, Kristin Pauker, Samuel R. Sommers & Nalini Am-
bady, In Blind Pursuit of Racial Equality?, 21 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1587 (2010). 
284 See id.  
285 Id. at 1588 (The color-blind version called for minimizing race based 
distinctions and considerations (e.g., “That means that we need to focus on how 
we are similar to our neighbors rather than how we are different,” “We want to 
show everyone that race is not important and that we’re all the same”)). 
286 Id. (“The value diversity version endorsed recognition of these same dif-
ferences (e.g., “That means we need to recognize how we are different from our 
neighbors and appreciate those differences,” “We want to show everyone that 
race is important because our racial differences make each of us special”)). 
287 Id. at 1588–89. 
288 Id. at 1589 (describing racist scenario involving a white student tripping 
a black student because he “knew he could tell that [the victim] played rough 
because he is Black”). 
289 See generally id. 
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With respect to the multiculturalism group, seventy-seven percent of 
the students perceived racism in the explicitly racist category; forty-three 
percent perceived racism in the ambiguously racist category; and zero 
percent perceived racism in the control category. On the other hand, stu-
dents who were primed for colorblindness tended not to report any racist 
incidents. Only fifty percent of the colorblind group perceived racism in 
the explicitly racist category; ten percent perceived racism in the ambig-
uously racist category; and zero percent perceived racism in the control 
category. The students’ reactions were videotaped.290 
The researchers then asked teachers who were unaware of the study 
to view the students’ videotaped responses to the incidents and then indi-
cate whether the behavior the children described warranted intervention 
by a teacher. The researchers found that the teachers were less likely to 
believe that descriptions of ambiguously and explicitly racist scenarios 
described by the colorblind group warranted teacher intervention.291 
Thus, not only were the students less likely to perceive racist incidents if 
they were previously exposed to colorblindness as a value, they were 
also less likely to describe the behavior they viewed to their teachers in a 
manner that would provoke intervention.292  
Although multiculturalism generates many social benefits, it also in-
volves risks. Studies show that whites do not see themselves as partici-
pants in racial and ethnic diversity.293 This could result from a tendency 
of whites not to see themselves consciously as a racial group or due to 
the way some people frame multiculturalism.294 This risk is not insur-
mountable. Ethnic and racial diversity policies need not preclude whites. 
Nonetheless, to the extent that diversity seeks to remedy past discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, then de-emphasizing whites is rational, not in-
vidious.295  
In addition, intergroup tension is not inherently bad, as the Court and 
some scholars suggest. Rather, intergroup racial tension might occur be-
cause suppressed minority viewpoints are finally receiving attention 
290 Id. at 1589. 
291 Id. at 1590. 
292 Id. 
293 See supra text accompanying note 198. 
294 See Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, But Now I See”: White Race Con-
sciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 
957 (1993) (“The most striking characteristic of whites’ consciousness of white-
ness is that most of the time we don’t have any.”); see also supra text accompa-
nying note 198 (discussing whites’ fear of exclusion from multiculturalism poli-
cy). 
295 John R. Dovidio, Tamar Saguy & Nurit Shnabel, Cooperation and Con-
flict within Groups: Bridging Intragroup and Intergroup Processes, 65 J. SOC. 
ISSUES 429, 440 (2009) (“Discussing power inequalities can implicate the re-
sponsibility that the advantaged group has in creating injustice thus admitting its 
‘moral debt’ toward the disadvantaged group.”). 
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from the majority.296 Silencing minority views for the sake of avoiding 
tension is a self-defeating goal. Forcing racial minorities to embrace 
colorblindness, especially within a context of racial inequality, causes 
resentment, withdrawal, and other harms.297 When equality and diversity 
occur, however, organizations and societies can operate more robustly 
and innovatively.298  
3.   Group-Based Societies and Rights 
Social scientists have found that all societies have historically in-
volved group-based hierarchy.299 Also, individuals do not exist outside of 
the sociocultural space in which they live.300 Despite the fundamental 
relevance of groups to society, the Court sees collective identity and 
296 Id. at 435 (discussing the risk of tension and conflict from clashing per-
spectives of dominant and subordinate groups but arguing that tolerating this 
tension could “create a reservoir of distinct resources and perspectives upon 
which the society may draw in times of need”); id. at 436 (arguing that “conflict 
can be a process that recognizes dissent, allows the expression of minority 
views and increases the diversity of ideas and perspectives available within the 
group”); Lisa Troyer & Reef Youngreen, Conflict and Creativity in Groups, 65 
J. SOC. ISSUES 409, 412–13 (2009) (discussing the benefits of dissent within 
organizations). 
297 Dovidio et al., supra note 292, at 440 (focusing on “commonalities, mu-
tual acceptance and empathy . . . will satisfy only the needs of the advantaged 
group and fail to address the disadvantaged group’s need for recognition and 
empowerment”); Deborah Son Holoien & J. Nicole Shelton, You Deplete Me: 
The Cognitive Costs of Colorblindness on Ethnic Minorities, 48 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 562, 564 (2012) (“Although colorblindness and 
multiculturalism are two different avenues to attaining intergroup harmony, our 
findings suggest that in short-term interracial interactions, colorblindness may 
hurt ethnic minorities’ cognitive functioning”); Victoria C. Plaut, Kecia M. 
Thomas, & Matt J. Goren, Is Multiculturalism or Color Blindness Better for 
Minorities?, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 444, 445 (2009) (“Our results suggest that domi-
nant-group members’ diversity beliefs (e.g., multiculturalism and color blind-
ness) have palpable implications for minority colleagues’ psychological en-
gagement. Paradoxically, emphasizing minimization of group differences 
reinforces majority dominance and minority marginalization.”); Valerie Purdie-
Vaughns, Claude M. Steele, Paul G. Davies, Ruth Ditlmann, & Jennifer Randall 
Crosby, Social Identity Contingencies: How Diversity Cues Signal Threat or 
Safety for African Americans in Mainstream Institutions, 94 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 615 (2008) (finding lowest levels of trust and highest levels of 
perceived identity threat among African Americans in environments with low 
minority representation coupled colorblind ideology). 
298 See Troyer & Youngreen, supra note 296 (discussing benefits of dissent 
in workplace); Plaut et al., supra note 297, at 445 (discussing negative work-
place effects of colorblindness upon persons of color). 
299 See SIDANIUS & PRATTO, supra note 186, at 31. 
300 See supra text accompanying notes 182–83. 
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rights as dangerous and inconsistent with American constitutional tradi-
tion.301 Both of these contentions are deeply problematic. 
A substantial amount of social science data demonstrates that, stand-
ing alone, groups do not harm society. Instead, nonrecognition of groups 
and the existence of group-based inequality diminish social cohesion. On 
the other hand, multiculturalism and the amelioration of social and eco-
nomic inequality improve social and institutional relations.302  
Furthermore, while American culture certainly promotes the idea of 
individualism over groups, this cultural tradition falls apart under closer 
scrutiny for at least two reasons. First, whites are more likely to accept 
individualism over group identity than are people of color.303 So, this 
tradition is not exactly “American” when the perspectives of people of 
color are taken into consideration. Second, research suggests a more 
complicated relationship between the things whites value in their own 
lives and their perception of what most whites want. In one study, for 
example, a group of white participants ranked the values they deemed 
important from their own perspective and the values that they thought 
were important for most white Americans.304 The results showed that on 
an individual basis whites valued “personal virtues and interpersonal 
relationships,” but they “characterized White Americans as placing value 
on the cultivation of more specific personal skills . . . and on the acquisi-
tion of material rewards.”305  
In addition, while the Court views group-based identities as danger-
ous and balkanizing, social scientists have also demonstrated the essen-
tial connection between the individual and society. The self is a social 
construct, formed out of interactions and responses to the broader socie-
ty.306 The Court, however, treats the two categories as mutually exclu-
sive.  
Moreover, despite contrary language in some cases, the Court has 
never applied a wholesale rule against the recognition of group rights. It 
is true that the political theorists who inspired the framers of the Consti-
tution heralded individual liberty, but individual liberty and group rights 
are not inevitably inconsistent.307 For example, the Equal Protection 
301 See supra text accompanying notes 230–32. 
302 See supra text accompanying notes 276–98. 
303 See supra text accompanying notes 202–04. 
304 Wolsko et al., supra note 280, at 638. 
305 Id. at 641(noting that “This pattern of rankings suggests that, at least to 
some degree, our White participants may not strongly identify with what they 
perceive as ‘White Americans in general’”). 
306 See supra text accompanying notes 182–85. 
307 Some research, for example, finds serious contradictions in Locke’s in-
dividualism. For instance, his assumption that propertied white men would con-
trol the state and enforce property rights implies a communitarian supremacy 
over the individual—especially those individuals whom he did not recognize as 
having full agency. See C.B. MacPherson, The Social Bearing of Lock’s Politi-
cal Theory, 7 W. POL. Q. 1 (1954). 
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Clause protects individuals from racial discrimination, but the Court ap-
plies strict scrutiny to racial classifications due to the history of racial 
subordination—not because certain individuals during American history 
experienced racial discrimination.308 Racial discrimination, as the Court 
has acknowledged, is dangerous due to the widespread oppression it 
caused.309 Modern equal protection doctrine evolved, in part, due to the 
Court’s desire to protect “discrete and insular minorities.”310 Also, the 
Court (and Congress) has specifically recognized group rights in many 
legal settings.311 In addition, the Court has frequently limited the rights 
308 See Jenny Rivera, An Equal Protection Standard for National Origin 
Subclassifications: The Context That Matters, 82 WASH. L. REV. 897, 908 
(2007) (“Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s apparent individual rights ap-
proach to equal protection, group affiliation based on race has been a vital con-
cern in equal protection analysis. Society, government institutions, and the 
courts have historically considered association with a particular group—both an 
individual’s voluntary association and association based on societal percep-
tion— as fundamental to the individual and the treatment accorded to the indi-
vidual in terms of equal protection.”). 
309 See supra text accompanying note 79. 
310 See Taunya Lovell Banks, What Is a Community? Group Rights and the 
Constitution: The Special Case of African Americans, 1 MARGINS 51, 54 (2001) 
(“Justice Stone in United States v. Carolene Products expressed the once com-
monly held belief that the Supreme Court can exercise judicial review to protect 
the rights of ‘discrete and insular’ minority groups from the tyranny of the ma-
jority.”). 
311 Id. at 53–54 (“Following western liberal tradition, constitutional rights 
in the United States are framed as individual rather than group rights. Courts, 
however, routinely recognized group rights. Corporate entities, which are volun-
tary communities of shareholders, have rights. Similarly, trade unions, which 
are voluntary communities of workers, have group-based rights to negotiate 
with employers on behalf of their members. Likewise, religious and charitable 
associations have group-based rights. So do Native American communities like 
the Hopi, Navajos, and Cherokees, who are formally recognized by the federal 
government and are treated as domestic sovereign entities. Even activist civil 
rights organizations have group rights. So, perhaps it is misleading to say that 
American law only protects individual rights.”); Ronald R. Garet, Communality 
and Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1001, 1006 (1984) 
(“Groups receive extensive protection under contemporary constitutional law. 
For example, groups appear to have a right, under the privacy, speech, and asso-
ciation norms of the first and fourth amendments, to refuse to divulge member-
ship lists. Groups also have a right under the free exercise clause of the first 
amendment to obtain exemptions from regulations that impose unnecessary 
burdens on group religiosity. Moreover, groups have a right under the thirteenth 
and fourteenth amendments to be free from discrimination or stigmatization by 
the state. Perhaps groups have a right under basic federalist principles to enforce 
‘community standards,’ or to regulate activities which are so obscene or inde-
cent as to outrage community norms of decency.”). 
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of individuals in order to accomplish broader societal goals.312 Accord-
ingly, Court precedent does not support the idea that group rights have 
no place in American constitutionalism. Furthermore, the spread of 
group rights within human rights law and in foreign constitutions pro-
vides an additional basis for the Court to rethink its analysis of group 
rights in the equal protection context.313  
4.   Racism Is Still Relevant 
Whites tend to view racism as insignificant.314 People of color, on 
the other hand, are more likely to believe it remains a substantial barrier 
to equal opportunity.315 By every statistical barometer of well-being, race 
impedes social and economic betterment.316 Individual and institutional 
acts of racism continue; also, the present-day effects of unremedied past 
discrimination continue to plague communities of color.317 
These observations do not negate the relevance of other social cate-
gories such as sex, sexual orientation, or poverty. These findings also do 
312 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 
96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987) (discussing Court doctrine that balances rights against 
the pursuit of governmental policy interests); Jud Mathews & Alec Stone Sweet, 
All Things in Proportion? American Rights Review and the Problem of Balanc-
ing, 60 EMORY L.J. 797, 813–86 (2011) (discussing balancing of rights and poli-
cy in U.S. adjudication). 
313 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 81 (2011) (justifying decision to invali-
date “life without parole sentences on juvenile nonhomicide offenders,” in part, 
because “the United States is the only Nation” that permits such sentences and 
because “Article 37(a) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child,” which the United States has not ratified, bans such sentences); Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (“Our determination that the death penalty 
is disproportionate punishment for offenders under 18 finds confirmation in the 
stark reality that the United States is the only country in the world that continues 
to give official sanction to the juvenile death penalty.”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (citing, in part, to foreign law in order to find an “emerg-
ing” tradition protecting sexual privacy); see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 
U.S. 815, 830–31 (1988) (“Although the death penalty has not been entirely 
abolished in the United Kingdom or New Zealand (it has been abolished in Aus-
tralia, except in the State of New South Wales, where it is available for treason 
and piracy), in neither of those countries may a juvenile be executed. The death 
penalty has been abolished in West Germany, France, Portugal, The Nether-
lands, and all of the Scandinavian countries, and is available only for exception-
al crimes such as treason in Canada, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland. Juvenile exe-
cutions are also prohibited in the Soviet Union.”); Banks, supra note 310, at 68–
72 (discussing rise of group protection by human rights charters and foreign 
courts, but questioning whether the United States would agree to such an ap-
proach). 
314 See supra text accompanying notes 203–05. 
315 Id. 
316 See supra text accompanying note 205. 
317 Markus et al., supra note 184, at 243–49. 
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not imply that every negative event in the lives of persons of color stems 
from racism. Instead, these findings mean that equal opportunity remains 
elusive for many Americans due to race. To the extent that the Equal 
Protection Clause was intended to ameliorate racial oppression, the 
Court’s doctrine does not facilitate the achievement of that goal. Even if 
original intent is irrelevant, the Court has not even tried to justify its 
privileging of white beliefs about race—even those that are patently in-
correct from an empirical standpoint—over the values held by subordi-
nate groups. 
5.   Whites Are Not Racially Oppressed 
Although recent studies suggest that whites think that they are a vul-
nerable racial class, this belief is not true. The same statistics that 
demonstrate the subordinate position of persons of color document the 
privilege of whites.318 Immunity from the debilitating impact of racism is 
a powerful social advantage. Possession of the intergenerational benefits 
of racial privilege is also a tremendous asset that advances the economic, 
political, and social status of whites.319  
This analysis does not mean that whites never experience racial or 
other forms of mistreatment. Nor does it mean that any state action that 
singles out whites is justifiable. This analysis does, however, imply that 
the Court should give private and state actors more latitude to treat 
whites and persons of color differently, within reasonable constraints, in 
order to remedy pervasive and substantial racial inequality. Whites and 
persons of color are not similarly situated with respect to the distribution 
of social resources. Racism caused this extreme imbalance. Recognizing 
race in order to remedy racial injustice does not constitute racism. That 
logic would, by analogy, call into question a policy that freed slaves on 
the grounds that doing so would discriminate against people who are not 
slaves. The reverse-discrimination legitimizing myth began in the mid-
nineteenth century when Congress began to pass laws to ameliorate the 
conditions of racial inequality and slavery.320 It continues to frame argu-
318 Stephanie M. Wildman & Adrienne D. Davis, Language and Silence: 
Making Systems of Privilege Visible, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 881, 895 (1995) 
(“Anti-discrimination advocates focus only on one portion of the power system, 
the subordinated characteristic, rather than seeing the essential links between 
domination, subordination, and the resulting privilege.”). 
319 See Ira Katznelson, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE: AN 
UNTOLD HISTORY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 
(2005) (discussing the various twentieth century policies that created white 
wealth); Melvin Oliver and Thomas M. Shapiro, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE 
WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY (2nd ed. 2006) (discuss-
ing racial disparities related to intergenerational transfer of wealth).  
320 See supra text accompanying notes 213–14. 
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ments in opposition to racial justice, and it serves as a justification for 
the perpetuation of racial inequality.321  
B.   Towards an Equal Protection Doctrine That Actually Protects 
This section argues that the Court should not enable the anxieties 
that whites or individual justices have regarding balkanization. Barring a 
very catastrophic event, the United States will remain ethnically and ra-
cially diverse. An equality doctrine that discounts diversity, groups, and 
equality does not reflect the sociocultural landscape of the country. 
Moreover, this doctrine increases inequality and tension—the exact op-
posite outcome of the Court’s stated purpose.322 The most effective equal 
protection doctrine for contesting group dominance is antisubordination 
theory. 
1.   What Is Antisubordination Theory? 
Many legal scholars have urged the Court to reform equal protection 
doctrine by applying antisubordination theory.323 According to antisub-
ordination theory, the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the “subjugation 
or the formation of a caste structure.”324 Antisubordination theory seeks 
to eliminate state action that “imposes or reinforces the social and eco-
nomic vulnerability of classes of persons.”325  
321 See supra text accompanying notes 215–17. 
322 See supra text accompanying notes 276–98. 
323 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §16-21, at 
1515 (2d ed. 1988); Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and 
Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003 (1986); Dorothy E. Roberts, Punish-
ing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of 
Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1454 (1991); Reva Siegel, Equality Talk: An-
tisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles Over 
Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470 (2004); Cass Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 
92 MICH. L. REV. 2410 (1994). See also Hutchinson, Inversion of Privilege and 
Subordination, supra note 3, at 682–98. 
324 Cass Sunstein makes this point in his groundbreaking article on the sub-
ject of caste and equal protection: 
[T]he anticaste principle forbids social and legal practices 
from translating highly visible and morally irrelevant differ-
ences into systemic social disadvantage, unless there is a very 
good reason for society to do so. On this view, a special prob-
lem of inequality arises when members of a group suffer from 
a range of disadvantages because of a group-based character-
istic that is both visible for all to see and irrelevant from a 
moral point of view. This form of inequality is likely to be un-
usually persistent and to extend into multiple social spheres, 
indeed into the interstices of everyday life. 
See Sunstein, supra, note 323, at 2411–12. 
325 Hutchinson, Not Without Political Power, supra note 70. 
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Because antisubordination theory addresses concrete manifestations 
of deprivation, it would not invalidate policies simply because they take 
race into account. Instead, antisubordination theory would also permit 
state action taken to ameliorate the conditions of inequality, even if it 
categorized people by race. Also, rather than following the antidifferen-
tiation approach that the Court currently utilizes, antisubordination theo-
ry would treat as impermissible or at least suspicious any state action, 
intentional or otherwise, that compels vulnerable social groups to live 
“perpetually in social and economic deprivation”—even if those policies 
were facially neutral with respect to race.326  
Furthermore, as many other scholars have observed, antisubordina-
tion theory has tremendous support in constitutional history and tradi-
tion. The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified to invalidate the Black 
Codes, which the Southern states enacted to restore racially based slav-
ery.327 The Black Codes were not infamous simply because they men-
tioned race; instead, these laws offended notions of fairness because they 
sought to nullify the Thirteenth Amendment and reenact slavery.328 The 
Court’s first opinion that construed the meaning of the Reconstruction 
Amendments recognized the antisubordination purpose of these enact-
ments. In The Slaughter-House Cases, the Court found that “the pervad-
ing purpose” of the Reconstruction Amendments was the “freedom of 
the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and 
the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppres-
sions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over 
him.”329 Today, however, the Court construes the Fourteenth Amendment 
as a tool for enforcing white opinions regarding the status of race rela-
tions and the appropriateness of race-based remedies. Antisubordination 
theory would reject the privileging of dominant social groups. 
2.   A Few Thoughts About Dignity 
Although dignity-based arguments should not supplant equal protec-
tion, these arguments are not inherently harmful to social justice. In-
stead, as proponents of dignity claims have argued, this particular ap-
proach has helped vulnerable classes, particularly LGBT individuals, 
secure legal victories. 
326 Id.  
327 Id. 
328 Id. 
329 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 71 (1872); see also Strauder v. West 
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879) (Reconstruction Amendments give blacks 
right against discriminatory and “unfriendly” laws and from state action “imply-
ing inferiority in civil society, lessening the security of their enjoyment of the 
rights which others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps towards reducing 
them to the condition of a subject race”); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11–12 
(1967) (finding that anti-miscegenation law promotes “White Supremacy” 
which violates the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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That dignity claims have the possibility of producing successful out-
comes for vulnerable classes does not mean that they should replace 
equal protection. Group dominance stems from the unequal possession 
of political power and resources. Dignity arguments that rest on liberty 
do not require eradication of these distinctions. Instead, in its current 
form, the dignity doctrine attends to the emotional or stigmatic effects of 
state action. These same concerns, however, have led to the judicial in-
validation of numerous policies that were implemented to ameliorate the 
conditions of racial inequality.330  
Additionally, dignity arguments do not focus on power disparity 
among social groups. In fact, legal scholars have praised dignity-based 
claims because they make the dynamics of social group relationships 
irrelevant.331 It is impossible to remedy the harms of racial inequality, 
however, without considering group-based inequality. Some racial inju-
ries resemble stigmatic harms.332 Many others, however, relate to materi-
al deprivation.333 Because dignity doctrines do not provide redress for 
substantive inequality, they cannot replace a robust antisubordination 
analysis.334 Indeed, several dignity cases already reveal the limits of this 
doctrine for vulnerable social groups.335 Litigants should certainly use 
available doctrines that can help them achieve litigation victories. These 
victories, however, should not determine how legal scholars and courts 
interpret equal protection, especially if the resulting interpretation sus-
tains group domination. 
330 See Markus et al., supra note 184, at 243–49. 
331 See Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 5, at 776 (“The 
Court seems to understand pluralism as a challenge to a progressive agenda. At 
the same time, it has seen that challenge as one that can be overcome by using 
liberty analysis, which draws on a broader, more inclusive form of ‘we.’”). 
332 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (“Such considerations 
apply with added force to children in grade and high schools. To separate them 
from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race gener-
ates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect 
their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”). 
333 See Markus et al., supra note 184, at 243–49. 
334 Even if dignity doctrines addressed economic needs, this would inevita-
bly raise questions of equality. For example, states might exclude some groups 
from the substantive right or provide less to other groups. Because group-based 
inequality will remain a structural aspect of American society, legal equality 
concerns will necessarily arise. 
335 See Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (placing dignity of 
Southern states above black and Latino voters); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 
124 (2007) (placing dignity of medical profession above rights of women to an 
abortion); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 
701 (2007) (placing dignity of individual white students against the interest of 
students of color not to attend racially isolated schools); Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (failing to find an 
undue burden for class of poor women, but finding one for married women). 
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CONCLUSION 
Neurological studies suggest that people detect skin color very rapid-
ly, in 120 milliseconds, or less than 1/7 of a second.336 Prevailing equal 
protection doctrine, however, rests on the fiction that people can become 
blind to race. The history of racial oppression should make the Court 
sensitive to social policies that categorize individuals according to race. 
This same history, however, should also lead the Court to adopt a critical 
stance towards policies that justify the systemic inequality of the same 
classes of people who, due to historical and contemporary discrimina-
tion, occupy the bottom end of America’s racially hierarchical society. 
Instead, the Court has taken the opposite approach. The Court has trans-
formed the Equal Protection Clause into a formidable barrier to social 
policies that seek to remedy racial oppression. At the same time, the 
Court construes the Equal Protection Clause as generally permitting pol-
icies that cause significant harm to racially oppressed individuals—so 
long as those policies do not mention race explicitly. Furthermore, the 
Court has expressed a willingness to depart from its deferential stance 
towards policies that disparately affect racial classes when these practic-
es harm whites. The Court has also explained that it must apply strict 
scrutiny to policies implemented to ameliorate the conditions of racial 
subordination in order to make sure they do not harm innocent whites. 
Taken together, the Court’s differential stances towards remedial uses of 
race and facially neutral but racially injurious policies help to facilitate, 
by design or effect, racial dominance in the United States.  
The Court’s equal protection doctrine also implements core beliefs 
about race relations that whites hold, while it rejects the positions taken 
by most persons of color. The Court prefers colorblindness to multicul-
turalism as a method of preserving social cohesion; rejects group identity 
and favors individualism for social organization; treats racism as a relic 
of prior generations; and perceives whites as racial victims. Enforcement 
of these beliefs—which an abundance of social science data refutes or 
undermines—legitimizes present-day conditions of racial inequality. 
Furthermore, while the Court contends that its rejection of group-based 
equality claims will boost social cohesion, empirical research shows that 
it has the opposite effect. Colorblindness and individualism combined 
with racial and class inequality exacerbate social divisions.  
 Because equal protection doctrine currently offers very little hope to 
vulnerable classes, some scholars have looked for alternatives. The 
Court’s recent openness to using dignity-based claims to extend protec-
tion to vulnerable groups has led some scholars to promote the Due Pro-
cess Clause as a substitute for equal protection. Although switching to 
dignity might generate litigation victories, this doctrinal setting cannot 
336 Tiffany A. Ito & Geoffrey R. Urland, Race and Gender on the Brain: 
Electrocortical Measures of Attention to the Race and Gender of Multiply Cate-
gorizable Individuals, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 616, 621 (2003). 
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provide comprehensive relief for the variety of harms that racism causes. 
These harms include material as well as stigmatic injuries. The Court’s 
dignity doctrine, however, only targets stigmatic and procedural harms; 
it does not seek to diminish group-based material deprivation. In fact, 
some scholars favor dignity arguments precisely because they do not 
require examination of group-based dynamics.  
Furthermore, the Court has utilized dignity arguments to invalidate 
remedial usages of race. It has ruled that state and federal policies de-
signed to prevent and remedy racial subordination offend the dignity of 
whites and state governments, assigning to states a human-like quality. 
When confronted with a choice of promoting racial egalitarianism over 
inequality, the Court chose the latter.  
Application of antisubordination equality theories can help refashion 
Court doctrine so that it provides actual protection to vulnerable groups. 
Antisubordination theories, however, will continue to face resistance 
from an ideologically polarized Court with a majority of justices who 
strongly support current approaches to equal protection. Evolution in 
Court doctrine will require the same forces that have led to legal changes 
historically, including social movement activism, election politics, public 
opinion, and cues from the political branches. Legal academics should 
contribute to this process by highlighting the role that the Court plays in 
preserving inequality and by continuing to craft theories that can inform 
equality doctrine in a more favorable judicial climate. 
*** 
 
